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Formation of contract 
Sanctity of contracts 
10.1 The case of Tee Soon Kay v AG [2007] 3 SLR 133 presented the 
Court of Appeal with an opportunity to restate the fundamental 
importance of upholding the sanctity of contracts. In this case, the 
appellants were a group of public officers who had opted to irrevocably 
convert from the pension scheme to the Central Provident Fund 
(“CPF”) scheme in 1973. More than 30 years later, the appellants 
commenced the present proceedings and contended, unsuccessfully, that 
they were entitled to return to the pension scheme on the ground, inter 
alia, that the purported condition of irrevocability was ultra vires and 
unconstitutional. Once the arguments on unconstitutionality fell apart, 
the appellants’ application was, in substance, a request that the court 
sanction its breach of contract. Such a request, if permitted, would 
“dismantle the very foundation and structure of the law of contract 
itself” (at [109]). Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA thus observed: 
The law of contract is, simply put, premised on parties fulfilling 
promises made to each other pursuant to a legal agreement entered 
into between them. What, therefore, the appellants are attempting to 
do is to ignore the very foundation of what a legal contract is about in 
the first instance. If parties were allowed to walk away from contracts 
simply because they felt that the contract entered into was no longer 
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to their advantage, chaos would ensue. Indeed, this would be an 
understatement. The very concept of an ordered society depends on 
parties observing the law in general and the promises validly made 
under law to each other in particular. This is not only obvious and 
axiomatic; it is utterly essential to a proper functioning of society 
itself. 
Certainty and completeness 
10.2 The well-established principle that an agreement lacking in 
essential terms cannot constitute a binding contract was applied in 
Colliers International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Senkee Logistics Pte Ltd 
[2007] 2 SLR 230. In that case, an estate agent’s claim against the vendor 
for commission purportedly due in respect of a sale of the vendor’s 
property failed because no agreement was in fact reached on the 
quantum of the commission. This does not suggest, of course, that a 
contract would invariably fail if the parties have yet to agree to a price, 
or that a genuine bargain could be struck down on the ground that it 
lacks some subsidiary or inessential term. In the present case, however, 
the term disputed was by no means minor or subsidiary in nature. On 
the contrary, the amount of commission went to the heart of the parties’ 
agreement. The agent’s claim that a binding contract had resulted via 
conduct also failed because the relevant agreement could not be inferred 
from the mere fact that the vendor had completed the sale with the 
purchaser. The agent appreciated that there was a real risk that it would 
not be remunerated when it proceeded to facilitate the transaction 
without first securing a firm commitment on its commission, and such 
a risk had indeed materialised. In any event, even if there had been a 
binding contract, the claim for commission would still have failed 
because the agent was a factor, but not the effective cause of the sale. 
10.3 In T2 Networks Pte Ltd v Nasioncom Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 SLR 1 
(see also para 10.4 below on “Consideration”) Judith Prakash J rejected 
an argument that the parties were bound by a settlement agreement on 
the ground, inter alia, that the agreement lacked certainty. Although it 
was clear that the parties had in fact agreed to certain payment 
obligations, they had not in fact agreed to a payment schedule. On the 
evidence available, it was not possible to imply that payment would be 
made within a reasonable time as it was clear that one of the parties 
would not have agreed to such a term. 
Consideration 
10.4 The alleged settlement agreement in T2 Networks Pte Ltd v 
Nasioncom Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 SLR 1 (see para 10.3 above on “Certainty 
and completeness”) was also found to be invalid for lack of 
consideration. In that case, the plaintiff, a company providing 
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telecommunications and internet services, had entered into a number of 
agreements to provide its services to the defendant, a company 
incorporated in Malaysia. The plaintiff claimed against the defendant 
for payments due and owing on these agreements. In defence, the 
defendant argued that the plaintiff was precluded from making these 
claims by the terms of a settlement agreement binding the parties. 
Judith Prakash J held that the promises comprised in this agreement 
were invalid for lack of consideration. First, the agreement provided for 
the transfer of 51% of the shares in the plaintiff to the defendant’s 
nominees but no consideration was stated for this transfer. Secondly, the 
defendant undertook to “settle the outstanding debts to [the plaintiff]” 
but this promise was not in and of itself sufficient consideration since 
the defendant was already legally bound to pay those sums. Although 
the promise to pay an existing debt could constitute consideration if it 
were made as a compromise of a disputed claim, this was not the case 
because no material dispute existed between the parties at the relevant 
time. Finally, the defendant’s undertaking to make payments for sums 
owing by the plaintiff to third party creditors was also found to be 
invalid as there was no evidence that the defendant had agreed to or 
assumed the plaintiff ’s legal obligations to the third parties. 
Estoppel 
10.5 In (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 171 at 173–174, we noted at 
paras 10.7–10.8 that in the case of Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad bin Talib v 
A Formation Construction Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 778, Judith Prakash J 
had endorsed the view that it was unnecessary for a party relying on the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel to establish that he had suffered 
detriment. As this holding was not challenged by counsel on appeal, the 
Court of Appeal did not see fit to comment on the same in Abdul Jalil 
bin Ahmad bin Talib v A Formation Construction Pte Ltd [2007] 
3 SLR 592. 
10.6 In Tee Soon Tay v AG [2007] 3 SLR 133 (see para 10.1 above on 
“Sanctity of contracts”), Andrew Phang JA helpfully discussed the scope 
and rationale of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The learned judge 
explained (at [114]) that “the doctrine was developed in order to avoid 
the injustice that would otherwise result when a contracting party 
pleaded an absence of consideration” and is therefore underpinned by 
the notion of unconscionability. The learned judge further noted that 
uncertainty still surrounds the question whether this doctrine could be 
invoked as a cause of action, although such a development had in fact 
taken place in Australia, and there was indication that the traditional 
position could be reviewed in the future. 
10.7 The question whether an estoppel by convention applied to 
prevent a party from denying that an assumed state of affairs existed 
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arose in Travista Development Pte Ltd v Tan Kim Swee Augustine [2007] 
3 SLR 628 (see paras 10.15–10.17 below on “Construction of terms”). 
Here, the defendants had on 12 December 2006 contracted to sell their 
property to the plaintiff. As the plaintiff was a foreign-incorporated 
company, the sale was conditional upon the plaintiff obtaining a 
Qualifying Certificate (“QC”) from the Singapore Land Authority 
(“SLA”) and cl 9(b) of the agreement provided, inter alia, that the 
plaintiff was to use “best endeavours” to obtain the approval and to do 
so “without delay”. Clause 3.2 of the agreement further provided that 
the completion of the sale was to take place within six weeks from the 
date of receipt of the QC or within three months from the date of the 
agreement, whichever was the later. The SLA approved the plaintiff ’s 
application for the QC on 29 December 2006 but the QC would only be 
issued upon the plaintiff furnishing a banker’s or insurer’s guarantee to 
guarantee the plaintiff ’s compliance with the terms of the QC. Having 
been informed of the approval, the defendants assumed that the 
plaintiff would swiftly comply with the said condition and procure the 
issue of the QC. On that basis, both parties’ lawyers made preparations 
for the transaction to be completed on 12 March 2007, that date being 
the “later” date determined in accordance with cl 3.2. 
10.8 Completion did not, however, take place on 12 March 2007 as 
the plaintiff had not obtained the guarantee in time and the defendants 
terminated the agreement on that ground. Thereafter, the plaintiff 
commenced proceedings seeking a declaration that it was entitled to 
complete the transaction six weeks after the issue of the QC. In the High 
Court, Judith Prakash J found that the defendants were entitled to 
terminate the agreement as the plaintiff had not employed best 
endeavours to obtain the QC in time. Prakash J further held, obiter, that 
the parties’ conduct gave rise to an estoppel which prevented the 
plaintiff from denying that 12 March 2007 was the expected completion 
date. Having permitted transfer forms dated 12 March 2007 to be sent to 
the defendants, the plaintiff was aware of the defendants’ expectation to 
complete the transaction on that date but took no step to inform the 
defendants that the QC would not be issued in time. On these facts, it 
was unconscionable to allow the plaintiff to deny that 12 March 2007 
was the expected completion date. 
10.9 The Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s finding on the 
issue of breach but disagreed with its conclusion on the issue of estoppel 
(see Travista Development Pte Ltd v Tan Kim Swee Augustine [2007] 
SGCA 57). The evidence did not establish that the parties had acted on a 
shared assumption. At its highest, the respondent-vendor had assumed 
that the appellant-purchaser would use its best endeavours to obtain the 
QC but that was not a sufficient basis for assuming that the completion 
date would definitely be 12 March 2007. Even if the purchaser had used 
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its best endeavours, there was no certainty that the QC would be 
obtained in time to complete the transaction on 12 March 2007. 
Formalities 
10.10 In Seah Boon Lock v Family Food Court [2007] 3 SLR 362, the 
defendant attempted to resist a claim on the ground that an agreement 
for the lease of certain hawker stall premises was unenforceable under 
s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed) because it was not 
signed. Rejecting this argument, Andrew Ang J held s 6(d) is satisfied if 
the document in question set out all the material terms of the 
agreement (even if it was not prepared in the form of a memorandum), 
and further that the requirement for signature might be satisfied if the 
agreement is evidenced by two documents, only one of which is signed. 
On the facts, the signature requirement was met because the unsigned 
agreement was followed by a signed letter from the defendant 
confirming the lease. In addition, since the first plaintiff had already 
performed those contractual obligations which were due, the defendant 
would be estopped from invoking the statutory provision to deny its 
contractual obligations. 
10.11 A similar issue arose in Reindeer Developments Inc v Mindpower 
Innovations Pte Ltd [2007] SGHC 170. Here, the plaintiff vendor orally 
agreed to grant an option to the defendant purchaser. The purchaser 
signed the option agreement and paid the deposit by way of a cheque, 
which was subsequently presented for payment and cleared. The vendor 
did not, however, sign the option agreement upon receipt of the same 
and reneged on the deal on learning that the property market was on 
the rise. Lai Siu Chiu J held for the purchaser, rejecting the vendor’s 
argument that the option agreement was unenforceable for non-
compliance with s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed). Lai J 
applied the settled proposition that s 6(d) does not require that the 
contract itself be in writing, and that provision is complied with if the 
“requisite three Ps” are present. As the purchaser’s representative had 
identified the property on the reverse of the cheque, the price of the 
property was known, and as the identities of the parties were also 
reflected on the cheque itself, all the material terms of the option had 
been reflected in writing, and hence, the requirement of s 6(d) complied 
with. 
The terms of the contract 
Construction of terms 
10.12 The importance of the factual matrix to the construction of 
contracts was emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Sandar Aung v 
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Parkway Hospitals Singapore Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 891 (see also (2006) 
7 SAL Ann Rev 171 at 175, para 10.10). The appellant had executed an 
agreement which obliged her to be liable for “all charges, expenses and 
liabilities incurred by and on behalf of the patient”, being her mother 
and who had been admitted to the plaintiff ’s hospital for an angioplasty 
procedure. The appellant had also signed a document which estimated 
the hospital charges at approximately $15,000. As a result of unexpected 
post-surgery complications, the final bill rendered far exceeded the 
initial estimate. The appellant argued that on a proper construction of 
the agreement, the scope and ambit of her undertaking was limited to 
those charges incurred by the patient in connection with the 
angioplasty, and she was thus not liable for the invoiced sum. At trial, 
the court had taken the view that the words “all charges, expenses and 
liabilities” have to be given their plain meaning and could not be limited 
to the estimated charges (see (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 171 at 175, 
para 10.10). The Court of Appeal disagreed with this reading of the 
phrase. Andrew Phang JA, delivering the judgment of the court, stated 
(at [19]): 
The focus … ought not to be on the word ‘all’ but, rather, on the type 
of charges, expenses and liabilities that the parties intended to be 
covered under the contract … It would then follow that the appellant 
would be liable for all of the charges that fell within the ambit and 
scope of the contract. [emphasis in original] 
10.13 As for what the ambit and scope of the contract is, this depends 
on a proper construction of the contract itself. In this regard, the court 
noted that, as no contract exists in a vacuum, its language has to be 
construed in the context in which the contract is made, ie, the factual 
matrix. In response to the respondent’s argument that such an approach 
in the present case would offend the “four corners” rule of construction 
as the terms of the contract were clear, the court observed (at [29]) as 
follows: 
[E]ven if the plain language of the contract appears otherwise clear, 
the construction consequently placed on such language should not be 
inconsistent with the context in which the contract was entered into if 
this context is clear or even obvious, since the context and 
circumstances in which the contract was made would reflect the 
intention of the parties when they entered into the contract and 
utilised the (contractual) language they did. It might well be the case 
that if a particular construction placed on the language in a given 
contract is inconsistent with what is the obvious context in which the 
contract was made, then that construction might not be as clear as was 
initially thought and might, on the contrary, be evidence of an 
ambiguity. [emphasis in original] 
10.14 In the circumstances, the court concluded that regard must be 
had to the context and terms of the estimate, which clearly showed that 
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the scope of the appellant’s liability was confined to the angioplasty 
procedure. 
10.15 It is an established principle of documentary interpretation that 
clauses in a written agreement cannot be read in isolation but must be 
read in the context of the entire document. Additionally, in the 
construction of a contract, every part should, where possible, be given 
effect and no part should be considered redundant or surplus. These 
principles were applied by the Court of Appeal in Travista Development 
Pte Ltd v Tan Kim Swee Augustine [2007] SGCA 57 (for facts, see 
para 10.7 above on “Estoppel”) in determining the completion date for 
the purposes of an agreement for the sale and purchase of property. The 
completion date defined by cl 3.2 of the agreement depended on the 
later of two possible dates, specifically six weeks from the date of receipt 
of the QC or within three months from the date of the agreement. 
However, how quickly the QC might be received was itself dependent on 
the plaintiff ’s efforts and the agreement obliged the plaintiff to exert its 
“best endeavours” to obtain the QC without delay. It was contended by 
the defendants that if the plaintiff had used its best endeavours, it would 
have obtained the QC in time to complete the sale and purchase by 
12 March 2007 (which date was three months from the date of the 
agreement). The plaintiff, however, contended that it was entitled to 
complete the sale and purchase within six weeks from the date of its 
receipt of the QC. 
10.16 The Court of Appeal took the view that if the plaintiff ’s 
contention was right, this would render the obligation to use its best 
endeavours to obtain the QC “without delay” nugatory, a conclusion 
that could only be reached by ignoring the established principles of 
documentary interpretation. Thus, on an objective evaluation, the 
clause imposing the “best endeavours” obligation on the plaintiff had to 
be read together with cl 3.2 to determine the “later” date as 
contemplated by the parties. The court stated (at [23]): 
[T]he ‘best endeavours’ provision … was intended to fix the earliest 
date by which the [plaintiff] had to complete the purchase; if that date 
occurred earlier than the ‘later’ date as computed under cl 3.2 
(ie, 12 March 2007), then the ‘later’ date would be the Completion 
Date. Accordingly, unless the [plaintiff] was able to show that it had 
failed to obtain the QC by the ‘later’ date of 12 March 2007 despite 
having used its best endeavours to do so, it would be in breach of 
cl 3.2. 
10.17 It was, thus, necessary to determine whether the plaintiff had 
discharged its obligation to use its best endeavours to obtain the QC. 
The court stated the legal obligation imposed by a best endeavours 
clause as follows (at [22]): 
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The test to determine whether a party has exercised its best 
endeavours is an objective one. But, it is also a composite test in that 
the covenantor may also take into account its own interests. While the 
covenantor has a duty to use its best endeavours to perform its 
contractual undertaking within the agreed time, the duty is discharged 
upon the covenantor ‘doing everything reasonable in good faith with a 
view to obtaining the required result within the time allowed’. 
10.18 It will be recalled that the QC would only be issued upon the 
plaintiff furnishing a banker’s or insurer’s guarantee to guarantee the 
plaintiff ’s compliance with the terms of the QC. The plaintiff, however, 
failed to obtain a banker’s guarantee in time. The court found that the 
reason for the delay was that the plaintiff had coupled its application for 
the guarantee with a request to the banks to finance the purchase and 
redevelopment of the property. As the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence 
to show that the banks would not have agreed to provide the guarantee 
separately from overall financing for the purchase and redevelopment, 
the court concluded that the plaintiff had, in not applying for the 
guarantee separately, failed to use its best endeavours to obtain the QC. 
10.19 The aforementioned principles of contract interpretation were 
also applied by the High Court in MacarthurCook Property Investment 
Pte Ltd v Khai Wah Development Pte Ltd [2007] SGHC 93, wherein 
MacarthurCook Property Investment Pte Ltd (“MPI”) and 
MacarthurCook Ltd (“ML”) jointly applied for a declaration that an 
option agreement for the sale and leaseback of certain leasehold 
property still subsisted and remained valid and binding. The respondent 
(“KWD”) was the owner of the leasehold interest in certain property, 
the reversionary interest in which was owned by the Jurong Town 
Corporation. ML was an Australian company which was looking to 
establish a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) in Singapore, and MPI 
was its subsidiary and the trustee of the REIT. KWD granted MPI a call 
option which would require the former to enter into a sale and purchase 
agreement in respect of the property. The option stipulated a period 
ending 31 January 2007 (the “satisfaction period”) by which certain 
conditions had to be satisfied. These conditions included the obtaining 
of the approval of JTC for the disposal of KWD’s leasehold interest in 
the property, which cl 2 of the option obliged KWD to “use its best 
endeavours to procure … by the end of the Satisfaction Period”. The 
procurement of certain other approvals from JTC fell within the 
province of MPI, which was also similarly obliged to exercise best 
endeavours to secure the same. Clause 2 further provided that should 
JTC refuse to give the necessary approvals or subject such approvals to 
conditions that were considered unsatisfactory to the parties, either 
party would be entitled to terminate the option at the end of the 
satisfaction period. Lastly, cl 4.2 of the option provided for the option to 
terminate immediately upon the expiry of the satisfaction period if “the 
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Conditions are not either satisfied or waived by the end of the 
Satisfaction Period”. 
10.20 KWD duly applied to JTC seeking its approval to the 
transaction, which approval was not granted until 2 February 2007. In 
addition, the approval was conditional upon the REIT being listed. 
Thereupon, KWD wrote to MPI, adopting the position that as the 
conditions had not been satisfied by the end of the satisfaction period, 
the option was automatically terminated. The applicants argued, inter 
alia, that KWD’s literal reading of cl 4.2 was commercially absurd as it 
would allow KWD to withdraw from the transaction without incurring 
any liability by simply refusing to satisfy any of the conditions. Judith 
Prakash J disagreed with the applicants’ submission. Her Honour 
accepted that the rationale behind cl 4.2 was to “set down a date by 
which the parties would have a significant degree of certainty about 
whether the contingent requirements had been satisfied before they 
proceeded to expend resources to facilitate further progress of the sale 
and leaseback transaction” (at [32]). In any case, the option imposed a 
parallel obligation on KWD to use its best endeavours to procure the 
requisite approval. Accordingly, if KWD had refused to do so, it would 
be in breach of its contractual obligation and be liable in damages. 
KWD was, therefore, entitled to rely on cl 4.2 to terminate the option. 
Prakash J stated (at [39]) as follows: 
The Option would not survive the Satisfaction Period because 
satisfaction of the Conditions before the Satisfaction Period was the 
condition precedent to the exercise of the … Option but the party in 
default would not escape without liability. …Thus, notwithstanding 
that cl 4.2 would bring the Option to an automatic end if the 
Conditions were not satisfied by the end of the Satisfaction Period, if 
the non-satisfaction of the Conditions was in fact due to the 
respondent’s failure to exercise its best endeavours to procure the 
satisfaction of Condition 1, then the respondent would be liable in 
damages to the applicants. It could not, therefore, take the easy way 
out of the transaction by simply sitting back after executing the 
Option and waiting for the expiry of the Satisfaction Period. 
10.21 The question that had then to be considered was whether KWD 
had fulfilled its obligation to use best endeavours towards the 
satisfaction of the conditions within the stipulated period. The 
applicants argued that KWD had failed in its obligation and thus could 
not rely on its own default to insist on its strict legal rights. Prakash J 
found (at [72]) that KWD had “in fact acted from the beginning as a 
prudent man who was concerned to bring matters to a favourable 
conclusion”. However, the question was whether, in failing to “chase” 
JTC for its reply before 31 January 2007, it was in breach of its 
obligation. Her Honour considered this a “delicate question” as a man 
who was anxious to bring about a certain state of affairs that depended 
on the approval of a third party would often be a nuisance if he 
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continually pestered the third party for a positive response. On balance, 
however, her Honour took the view that KDW ought to have at least 
informed JTC of the vital importance of providing an answer before 
31 January 2007. In failing to do so, KDW was in breach of its obligation 
to exercise best endeavours. 
10.22 However, Prakash J accepted KWD’s argument that as the 
applicants were themselves obliged to procure certain approvals from 
JTC within the satisfaction period and had similarly not pressed JTC for 
a response within that time, they were not without fault. Thus, the 
applicants could not, in the circumstances, take advantage of the 
principle “no man may take advantage of his own wrong”. In Prakash J’s 
words (at [75]): 
[The applicants’] failure operates … to negate the consequences of the 
respondent’s similar failure. There are two ways of looking at this. The 
first is that each party was … in breach of its best endeavours 
obligation and therefore neither party could seek to rely on the wrong 
of the other so as to prevent the other from relying on the operation of 
cl 4.2. The second is that, neither party thought that the requirement 
of best endeavours obliged it to send JTC a reminder or inform JTC 
that 31 January 2007 was a vital date before which the answer to the 
applications should be provided. In either case, the result is that 
[KDW] remained entitled to rely on cl 4.2 notwithstanding its failure 
to chivvy JTC. 
10.23 The option was, therefore, held to have been terminated 
automatically by the end of the satisfaction period as the conditions had 
not been satisfied by then. 
10.24 In NTUC Co-operative Insurance Commonwealth Enterprise Ltd 
v Chiang Soong Chee [2007] SGHC 222, the High Court had to construe 
a disability benefit clause in a life insurance policy. The clause provided 
as follows: 
The disability referred to herein must be total and permanent and 
such that there is neither then nor at any time thereafter any work, 
occupation or profession that the Life Assured can ever sufficiently do 
or follow to earn or obtain any wages, compensation or profit. 
10.25 The clause also provided that certain conditions, including, 
inter alia, the total and irrecoverable loss of the sight of both eyes or the 
loss by severance of both hands, would be considered total and 
permanent disability. There were two questions of interpretation the 
court had to address. First, whether the clause imposed, for the purposes 
of making payment, two requirements, ie, that the disability must be 
total and permanent and that this disability precluded the assured from 
gainful employment. Woo Bih Li J was of the view that the phrase “and 
such that” should be interpreted such that “total and permanent” meant 
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the inability of the assured from being engaged in gainful employment. 
In any case, the contra proferentem rule applies where there is ambiguity 
and this would require the provision to be read against the insurer who 
drafted the terms, reinforcing the argument for one requirement. 
10.26 The second question was whether it would be sufficient for the 
assured to establish that he could no longer substantially carry out his 
usual occupation (the broad interpretation), without having to establish 
that he was unable to carry out any work (the strict interpretation). In 
Woo J’s view, the literal meaning of the clause pointed clearly in favour 
of the strict interpretation. However, aware that the adoption of the 
strict interpretation could result in extreme and unfair consequences for 
the assured, his Honour took pains to review and distinguish cases that 
have decided in favour of the broad interpretation. In this connection, 
Woo J took account of the type of policy under consideration, the 
amount of premiums paid and whether the language used was clear. His 
Honour also took into consideration the possibility of insurance 
companies increasing the premiums charged for policies such as the one 
under present consideration should a broad interpretation be adopted. 
Woo J was of the view that whilst the strict interpretation would mean 
that claims could succeed only in the most extreme cases, eg, where the 
insured was in a vegetative state, the position was mitigated somewhat 
by the second part of the clause, which allowed for payment whenever 
there was, for example, a loss of sight of both eyes, regardless whether 
the assured was employable or not. On balance, thus, Woo J concluded 
that the strict interpretation was applicable. 
10.27 The general principles by which contractual documents are to 
be construed were set out by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation 
Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912. 
These principles were applied by the Court of Appeal in Lal Hiranand v 
Kamla Lal Hiranand [2007] 2 SLR 165 in the construction of a deed of 
settlement made between husband and wife to settle their disputes over 
the wills and estate of the husband’s father, MHR. By the deed, the 
husband undertook to “implement and faithfully carry out all the 
wishes of [MHR] as manifested and executed by [MHR] in the 1988 
Will both in substance and according to the spirit of the 1988 Will 
notwithstanding that the 1988 Will may in any way be defective or 
unenforceable in law”. 
10.28 The 1988 will was found to be forged, and the question was 
whether the husband’s undertaking was premised on the will being 
genuine. Kan Ting Chiu J, delivering the judgment of the court, held 
that the court’s role in the construction exercise was to ascertain the 
intention of the contracting parties by a consideration of the terms of 
the contract as a whole within the factual matrix of the transaction in 
question. His Honour concluded (at [27]) that: 
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The statement of the parties’ intention to resolve all the outstanding 
disputes between them should be taken as the reason for, and not as 
the form or substance of the [husband’s] undertakings. The 
[husband’s] obligations were limited to and governed by the terms of 
the undertakings. The undertaking to implement and carry out 
MHR’s wishes as manifested and executed by MHR in the will was 
conditional on there being a will, executed by MHR, in which he 
manifested his wishes. 
10.29 The court also affirmed the principle that uncertain terms in a 
contract cannot be given effect to where the court was unable to clarify 
the uncertainties sufficiently so that there was certainty and content to 
the obligations undertaken. The deed had imposed certain obligations 
on the husband with respect to the “Hiranand family companies”, a term 
which was not defined in the deed, nor was there a list of such 
companies appended to the deed. Kan J held that, although the court 
may ascribe a meaning to a term that was on its face uncertain, this 
could not be done in the present case. The term “Hiranand family 
companies” was a collective term for companies to be agreed on 
between the parties, and as there had been no agreement, the clauses in 
the deed containing the term were too uncertain and could not be cured 
by the court. Accordingly, no order for performance of the obligations 
contained in those clauses could be made. 
Implied terms 
10.30 The implied terms as to satisfactory quality and fitness for 
purpose under the Sale of Goods Act (Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed) (“SOGA”) 
were considered by the Court of Appeal in National Foods Ltd v Pars 
Ram Brothers (Pte) Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 1048. The respondent, PRB, had 
entered into various contracts for the sale of dried ginger slices to the 
appellant, NFL. The ginger slices supplied were heavily contaminated 
with mould, had high ash and moisture content and were dusty. NFL 
argued that the implied conditions as to quality and fitness for purpose 
had been breached. The Court of Appeal made some useful observations 
of the relationship between ss 14(2) and 14(3) of the SOGA. These 
observations may be summarised as the following propositions: 
(a) The function of s 14(2) is to establish a general 
standard by which goods supplied under a contract of sale are 
required to reach, whereas the function of s 14(3) is to impose, 
in transactions where the buyer, to the seller’s knowledge, 
require the goods to possess some special quality for some 
special purpose, a particular and higher standard tailored to the 
particular circumstances of the case. 
(b) In assessing the standard of “satisfactory quality”, the 
inquiry is an objective one undertaken from the view of a 
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reasonable person placed in the position of the buyer and 
armed with his knowledge of the transaction and its 
background. For the purposes of this inquiry, s 14(2B) provide a 
list of non-exhaustive factors which the court should only take 
into account in appropriate cases. The factor of “freedom from 
minor defects” in s 14(2B)(c) is targeted at mass-produced 
manufactured consumer goods, and not at agricultural and 
natural products such as fruits and vegetables where freedom 
from minor defects might be impossible to achieve. 
(c) The words “particular purpose” in s 14(3) are not used 
in contradistinction to a “general purpose” and do not mean 
that only a “special purpose” would be sufficient. Instead, they 
are used in the sense of being a “specified” or “stated” purpose. 
If no purpose is indicated, it would be assumed that goods are 
ordered for their normal purpose. 
(d) Once it has been shown that the particular purpose for 
which the goods are required was made known to the seller, the 
onus is on the seller to prove that the buyer did not rely, or that 
it was unreasonable for the buyer to rely, on the seller’s skill and 
judgment. The fact that both the buyer and seller are members 
of the same commodity market does not of itself show that the 
buyer did not rely on the seller, although it would tend to 
militate against the inference of such reliance. 
10.31 The court concluded that NFL had supplied ginger slices that 
were of unsatisfactory quality and were not fit for the particular purpose 
for which PRB required them. 
Exception clauses 
10.32 In B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd v Zurich 
Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 82, the High Court 
construed an exception clause in an insurance policy. The appellant was 
appointed by MediaCorp in respect of certain renovation works to be 
carried out at the latter’s premises. The contract required the appellant 
to take out a contractor’s all-risk policy of insurance, which the 
appellant did with the respondent. A fire broke out in a room in 
MediaCorp’s television building where repair works were being carried 
out. This resulted in damage to MediaCorp’s property for which the 
appellant was found liable. The appellant claimed against the 
respondent under the insurance policy. The policy contained an 
exclusion clause which was found by the District Judge, and accepted by 
Andrew Ang J, to have been intended to exclude any indemnity in 
respect of loss of or damage to property owned or possessed by, inter 
alia, MediaCorp. However, Ang J found on uncontroverted evidence 
that the respondent knew full well the coverage required was for the 
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purposes of the appellant’s contract with MediaCorp. As such, it would 
be “contrary to all sense of justice and fair play” if the exclusion was to 
operate to deny the very cover which the appellant required. In holding 
that the exclusion clause was, on the facts of the present case, 
inoperable, his Honour observed (at [57]–[60]) as follows: 
Commercial morality must perforce temper the unrelenting quest for 
profit; the more so with respect to insurers whose raison d’être is their 
provision of indemnity against the vicissitudes of life or the vagaries 
of fortune and where (in the absence of agreement or legislation to the 
contrary) utmost good faith underlies the relationship between the 
parties … Where the effect of any such exclusion is to take away the 
very essence of the cover thus leading to an absurdity, the courts will 
intervene to deny the exclusion clause its efficacy. Equally, where the 
insured has relied upon the insurer to provide cover for a specific 
purpose made known to the insurer prior to the issue of the policy 
without the latter’s demurrer and yet a standard printed exclusion 
clause takes away precisely such cover, the court will be failing in its 
duty if it does not intervene in such a situation even if, sans such 
reliance, the exclusion clause might not quite aptly be described as 
giving rise to an absurdity. 
10.33 In PT Soonlee Metalindo Perkasa v Synergy Shipping Pte Ltd 
(Freighter Services Pte Ltd, third party) [2007] 4 SLR 51, the High Court 
construed, in the context of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea, 
a clause which limited the liability of the defendant to “£100 British 
Sterling per package. To obtain higher limits of liability shipper must 
declare a greater value and pay additional freight to be agreed”. The 
plaintiff owned 300 bundles of deformed steel bars that the defendant 
had contracted to carry by sea from Singapore to Batam. During the 
voyage, the bars fell overboard. The defendant contended that its 
liability was limited by the limitation clause, which on the facts was 
found to have been incorporated into the contract of carriage. 
10.34 Judith Prakash J accepted that limitation clauses had to be read 
contra proferentem. However, her Honour was of the view that the clause 
under present consideration was plain and unambiguous. As limitation 
clauses were not, as a general rule subject to the same exacting standards 
that were applied to exclusion and indemnity clauses, the wording of the 
present clause was wide enough to encompass liability of any sort 
whatsoever and howsoever arising as long as it was in relation to the 
carriage of goods. Prakash J was, however, of the view that the language 
of the clause would not be wide enough to cover the defendant’s liability 
in respect of loss or damage that was deliberately caused. Her Honour 
was of the view that, if any reduction of one’s responsibility for 
deliberately inflicted injury was to be permitted, if at all, “very clear 
words” would be necessary. 




10.35 It is trite that any claim in misrepresentation is dependent on 
the establishment, at the outset, of a false statement of fact. In Tipper 
Corp Pte Ltd v JTC Corp [2007] SGHC 67, the plaintiff required a place 
from which to construct barges. The defendant offered to grant a licence 
to the plaintiff for the use of certain waterfront land for this purpose. 
The plaintiff alleged that, whilst it was contemplating whether to accept 
the defendant’s offer, an employee of the defendant orally represented to 
the plaintiff that all vessels in the waterfront in the vicinity of the 
licensed land would be removed within three months. Soon after the 
licence was granted, most of the vessels left the waterfront, except for a 
derelict vessel that remained moored there for many months thereafter. 
The plaintiff claimed that the oral representation amounted to negligent 
misrepresentation. Tan Lee Meng J dismissed the claim as the alleged 
representation was a statement of intention and not a statement of 
existing or past fact. Whilst recognising that a statement of an intention 
not honestly held could amount to a misrepresentation of fact in 
relation to the representor’s state of mind, his Honour observed that the 
plaintiff had neither asserted that the defendant did not honestly have 
the intention represented, nor adduced any evidence as to the issue. The 
claim, thus, failed at the outset. 
10.36 By s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed), the 
validity of a term in a contract that attempts to exclude or restrict 
liability or available remedies for misrepresentation is dependent on it 
satisfying the requirement of reasonableness under the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed). That is, the term “shall have been a 
fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the 
circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to 
or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made”. The 
question whether a particular clause falls within s 3 can be difficult to 
answer. A non-reliance clause (typically one which stipulates that a 
party has not relied on any representations of the other party to enter 
into the contract), for example, attempts to prevent a representee from 
establishing the element of reliance, and, if effective, could prevent a 
successful claim for misrepresentation. It is, however, not clear if, as a 
matter of jurisdiction, such a clause is subject to s 3. The question is 
whether the courts ought to look only at the literal wording of the 
particular clause (see, eg, Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd 
[2001] EWCA Civ 317), or whether it should consider the substance and 
effect of the clause (see, eg, Witter Ltd v TPB Industries [1996] 
2 All ER 573). The Court of Appeal appears to have assumed in Orient 
Centre Investments v Societe Generale [2007] 3 SLR 566 that such non-
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reliance clauses are always effective to exclude claims for 
misrepresentations. 
10.37 The appellants, Orient, had an investment account with the 
respondent, SG, which the former alleged it had been induced to open 
by certain representations of Goh, a client relationship manager in the 
employ of SG. Orient allegedly suffered substantial losses in relation to 
investments in certain structured products undertaken through the 
investment account. The various agreements relating to the opening of 
the account as well as the different investments contained, inter alia, 
non-reliance clauses pursuant to which Orient had represented that it 
had, in entering into these transactions, relied on its own judgment and 
not on any representations of SG or its employees, whether written or 
oral, other than those representations specifically provided for in the 
agreements. 
10.38 Counsel for Orient had argued that the non-reliance clauses had 
the effect of raising an evidential estoppel which could prevent a 
claimant from proving that he had relied on pre-contractual 
representations. However, in order to rely on the defence of estoppel, it 
had to be pleaded, which SG had failed to do. Counsel referred the court 
to the observations of Chadwick LJ in EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v Francis 
Patrick McGarrigan (27 October 1999) (CA) (unreported) that non-
reliance clauses can give rise to an evidential estoppel provided the 
following elements set out in Lowe v Lombank Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 196 
at 205 were pleaded and proven: 
(a) that the representation of non-reliance was clear and 
unequivocal; 
(b) that the representor (ie, the party making the 
representation of non-reliance) had intended that the other 
party should act on the representation of non-reliance; and 
(c) that the other party had believed that the representation 
of non-reliance was true and had been induced by that belief to 
act on it. 
10.39 The court held that counsel’s pleading point was unmeritorious 
as it was “sufficient for pleading purposes that the clauses are pleaded 
for their legal effect without having to put a label on the defence” 
(at [45]), and this SG had done. The court then concluded that, in the 
face of Orient’s own representations and warranties as contained in 
these clauses, “it was not possible for [Orient] to argue that [it] had 
relied on any alleged representation on the part of Goh” (at [50]). With 
respect, the matter involved more than just a matter of specifically 
pleading the term “estoppel” – it was necessary, in order for the estoppel 
to succeed, that the three elements in Lowe v Lombank be established. In 
this connection, Chadwick LJ had observed in Watford Electronics Ltd v 
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Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317 at [40] that the need to prove 
these elements of the estoppel may provide the representor with 
“insuperable difficulties; not least because it may be impossible for a 
party who has made representations which he intended should be relied 
upon to satisfy the court that he entered into the contract in the belief 
that a statement by the other party that he had not relied upon those 
representations was true”. 
10.40 This is, of course, a different question from whether s 3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act applied. The Court of Appeal in the present case 
was of the view that even if Goh had made the alleged 
(mis)representations, this would be of no avail to Orient as it had, 
through those “clear and specific” terms in the agreements, represented 
and warranted that it did not rely on any representation given by any of 
SG’s employees. This conclusion appears to suggest that the non-
reliance clauses were not subject to the reasonableness test under s 3. In 
the present case, as the parties are arguably experienced parties of equal 
bargaining power, the conclusion is probably correct. However, as a 
general proposition, it goes, with respect, too far as it would mean that 
there would be no need to subject such clauses to judicial scrutiny even 
when used against consumers or as between parties of unequal 
bargaining powers. 
Undue influence 
10.41 In Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2008] 1 SLR 237, the 
plaintiff, a private banking customer of the defendant bank, had 
executed a document under which she had granted a charge in favour of 
the bank over all monies in her account with the bank in order to secure 
liabilities of her son-in-law (Tommy) to the bank. As a result of 
Tommy’s default in discharging his liabilities, the bank effected a 
deduction from the plaintiff ’s account pursuant to the terms of the 
charge. The plaintiff sued for a return of the money deducted, alleging, 
inter alia, that her signature to the charge had been procured by 
Tommy’s undue influence on her, and as the bank had been “infected” 
by this alleged undue influence by its actual or constructive knowledge 
of Tommy’s wrongdoing, the charge was, accordingly, unenforceable. 
Applying the principles laid down in the House of Lords decision of 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge [2002] 2 AC 773, Lai Siu Chiu J stated 
(at [27]) as follows: 
[T]he plaintiff must first establish that the Charge was executed as a 
result of Tommy’s undue influence; second, that the defendant was put 
on inquiry as to the manner in which the Charge had been procured; 
and finally, that the defendant had failed to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the Charge had not been procured by undue influence. 
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10.42 As the relationship between a son-in-law and his mother-in-law 
did not fall within the class of relationships with respect to which the 
law adopts a “sternly protective attitude” (per Lord Nicholls in Royal 
Bank of Scotland v Etridge [2002] 2 AC 773 at [18]), the plaintiff had to 
establish, in order for a presumption of undue influence to arise, first, 
that she reposed trust and confidence in Tommy or that Tommy had 
acquired ascendancy over her, and second, that the transaction was not 
readily explicable by the relationship of the parties. On the first pre-
requisite, the court found on the evidence that, contrary to the 
plaintiff ’s claims of “naïve dependence” on Tommy, she was in fact the 
dominant person in the relationship. As for the second requirement, 
Lai J opined (at [35]) that: 
[T]he court should take a more holistic view of the circumstances as 
opposed to a blinkered and artificial preoccupation with financial 
considerations. In order to determine whether a transaction is 
explicable in terms other than undue influence, it becomes necessary 
to examine its context and to ascertain its true nature and objective. 
10.43 In the circumstances, the court found that while the charge was, 
from an economic perspective, disadvantageous to the plaintiff who 
gained no overt benefit, it was, nevertheless, explicable in the context of 
the particular familial relations involved. Specifically, the plaintiff was 
close to Tommy’s wife, who was her daughter, and an extension of 
financial assistance to Tommy was neither inexplicable nor unexpected. 
The plaintiff ’s claim on the ground of undue influence, therefore, failed 
in limine, and the court had no need to consider the doctrine of 
infection. 
10.44 It may, however, be useful to consider the issues that may arise if 
the plaintiff had indeed been a victim of undue influence. In this regard, 
two observations may be made. The first relates to the creditor being 
“put on inquiry”. The House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge 
[2002] 2 AC 773, [87] was clear that this did not require the creditor to 
look into whether undue influence was present or not. The House 
clarified that the only practical position to adopt was to regard creditors 
to be “put on inquiry” whenever the relationship between the surety and 
the debtor was non-commercial. The relationship between the plaintiff 
and Tommy was probably, in the absence of further information, non-
commercial. 
10.45 Secondly, the obligation imposed on the creditor to take 
reasonable steps placed an obligation on the creditor to take such steps 
as are necessary to “satisfy itself that the [surety] has had brought home 
to her, in a meaningful way, the practical implications of the proposed 
transaction” (per Lord Nicholls in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge 
[2002] 2 AC 773 at [53] and [54]). In this regard, Lai J’s statement 
(quoted above at para 10.41) that, in order to succeed against the 
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defendant bank, the plaintiff had also to establish that “the defendant 
had failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Charge had not 
been procured by undue influence” [emphasis added] may, with respect, 
be misleading. Indeed, as Lord Nicholls pointed out, it would be “plainly 
neither desirable nor practicable that banks should be required to 
attempt to discover for themselves” whether undue influence was 
present or not ([2002] 2 AC 773 at [53]). With respect, if creditors are 
not expected to discover the presence of undue influence, it might 
appear, logically at least, that they would not be expected to prevent the 
occurrence of such wrongdoing. 
10.46 Interestingly, a similar contention appeared to have been made 
in Malayan Banking Bhd v Sivakolunthu Thirunavukarasu [2008] 
1 SLR 149, albeit in a different context. The case involved a dishonest 
solicitor, Sivakolunthu, who, through a series of forged transactions, 
procured the transfer by the defendants of their interests in certain 
property to her and the second defendant, to be held as to 75% by her 
and as to 25% by the latter. These interests were then mortgaged to the 
plaintiff bank to secure a loan to Sivakolunthu alone. The plaintiff was 
represented in the mortgage transaction by Ho of the firm of Rodyk & 
Davidson, while the solicitor who appeared “on the record” as having 
acted for the defendants, one Dass, was the husband of Sivakolunthu 
and also from the same law firm as Sivakolunthu. The phrase “on the 
record” was used by the judge as Dass did not in fact act in these 
transactions nor was he party to the fraud. As the property came under 
the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 2004 Rev Ed) (“LTA”), the documents for 
these transactions were registered in the Registry of Land Titles which 
conferred an indefeasible title unless defeated by the fraud of the 
registered proprietor or his agent, in this case the plaintiff or Ho (see 
s 46(2) LTA; see also United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bebe bte Mohammad 
[2006] 4 SLR 884). 
10.47 The defendants sought to establish that the plaintiff and its 
agent, Ho, had been “so wilfully blind or voluntarily ignorant” in the 
matter as to be akin to being fraudulent. In this, it was contended, inter 
alia, that the plaintiff ’s agent, Ho, had knowledge of the undue influence 
Sivakolunthu had over the second defendant, and in failing to act on 
this, he was “wilfully blind”. 
10.48 It is automatically presumed that, in a transaction between a 
solicitor and his client, a relationship of influence, unless rebutted, 
exists. The defendants treated Sivakolunthu as a solicitor who was 
purchasing an interest in the property from her clients as she had in fact 
acted for them in effecting a settlement agreement between them (see 
The Law Society of Singapore v Sivakolunthu Thirunavukarasu [2005] 
SGDSC 13). However, in the present case, she did not appear, on the 
record, as acting for the defendants. Kan Ting Chiu J was, however, of 
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the view that where two members of a law firm are spouses, a rebuttable 
presumption of undue influence arose whenever one of them acted in a 
sale and purchase transaction for the vendor and the other was the 
purchaser. His Honour observed (at [37] and [38]) that: 
In this case, what could the plaintiff or Mr Ho have done? There was 
no legal basis to prevent M Dass & Co from acting for the defendants. 
However, I believe that, on a commercial basis, a lender bank 
uncomfortable with such a situation can impose a condition in the 
loan offer that the borrowers be represented by solicitors with no 
interest, direct or indirect, in the transaction other than as solicitors. It 
can be argued that a prudent solicitor in Mr Ho’s position would be 
cautious about M Dass & Co acting for the second defendant, who was 
offering his interest in the property to secure a loan to Mr Dass’s wife, 
and that a prudent solicitor should have taken action to eliminate the 
risk of undue influence. [emphasis in original] 
10.49 Nevertheless, his Honour concluded, undoubtedly correctly, 
that Ho was neither wilfully nor voluntarily ignorant. 
Illegality 
The ex turpi causa defence 
10.50 A useful decision illustrating the application of the ex turpi 
causa defence was handed down by Belinda Ang Eau Sen J in the case of 
Koon Seng Construction Pte Ltd v Chenab Contractor Pte Ltd [2008] 
1 SLR 375. The defendant company, Chenab Contractor Pte Ltd 
(“Chenab”), wished to secure a contract to supply workers and drivers 
to be deployed by the PSA Distripark and Container Logistics 
Department. The tender for this “PSA Contract”, was, however, limited 
to companies having a paid up capital of at least $1.5m. To satisfy this 
requirement, the second defendant, Raj Dev s/o Ram Singh (“Raj”), 
hatched a scheme with one Goh Koon Suan (“GKS”), the managing 
director of the plaintiff company, for Koon Seng Construction to be 
allotted $700,000 Chenab ordinary shares of $1 each and registered in 
its name, so as to raise Chenab’s paid up capital to the $1.5m level 
required to tender for the PSA Contract; nevertheless, no fresh capital 
was injected by GKS into Chenab for these shares. Chenab succeeded in 
the tender and the PSA Contract was awarded to it. 
10.51 Purportedly in accordance with the terms of the oral allotment 
agreement entered into between the parties, a call was made for the 
shares allotted to Koon Seng Construction. When the call was not met, 
Chenab resolved to forfeit these shares. This led to the present 
application whereby Koon Seng Construction sought an order declaring 
the forfeiture of the shares to be invalid, on the basis that the allotment 
agreement provided, instead, that the consideration for the allotment of 
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the shares lay in Koon Seng Construction making loans to Chenab or 
continuing to provide other forms of financial assistance by way of 
guarantees and indemnities to third parties. Chenab counterclaimed for 
the sum of $700,000. 
10.52 Rejecting much of the evidence tendered by both sides, Ang J 
found that the allotment agreement was a sham: there was no such 
agreement. Rather, the allotment and registration of the Chenab shares 
in the name of Koon Seng Construction was a paper exercise to create 
the appearance that the shares had been paid in cash when they had not. 
Despite appearances, the parties never had any intention that Koon Seng 
Construction might have to expend money of its own to meet some 
deferred payment arrangement. Accordingly, Ang J dismissed both the 
application to invalidate the forfeiture, and Chenab’s counterclaim for 
payment of the $700,000. 
10.53 Of particular interest in the present context is Ang J’s alternate 
ground for her decision. Ang J cited, with approval, Beldam LJ’s 
observation in Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] 
2 WLR 902 at 908 that, “[the court does] not consider that the public 
policy that the court will not lend its aid to a litigant who relies on his 
own criminal or immoral act is confined to particular causes of action”. 
Further, Ang J endorsed the four instances identified by the House of 
Lords in North-Western Salt Co v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] 
AC 451 where the court may apply the ex turpi principle of its own 
motion, namely: 
(a) Where a contract is ex facie illegal, the court will not 
enforce it, whether the illegality is pleaded or not. 
(b) Where the contract is not ex facie illegal, evidence of 
extraneous circumstances tending to show that it has an illegal 
object should not be admitted unless the circumstances relied 
on are pleaded. 
(c) Where facts not pleaded have been revealed in evidence 
(because, perhaps no objection was raised or because they were 
adduced for some other purpose) and which taken by 
themselves show an illegal objective, the court should not act on 
them unless it is satisfied that the whole of the relevant 
circumstances are before it. 
(d) Where the court is satisfied that all the relevant facts are 
before it and it can see clearly from them that the contract had 
an illegal object, it may not enforce the contract, whether the 
facts were pleaded or not. 
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10.54 Ang J then concluded (at [37]), after traversing recent English 
Court of Appeal authority on the extent of reliance on illegal or 
immoral activity as to trigger the ex turpi defence, that: 
… the ex turpi maxim requires a ‘reliance test’ to be satisfied. The 
claim must be ‘founded on’ or ‘arise from’ an illegal act of the claimant 
… or the illegal act must necessarily be pleaded or relied upon to 
sustain the claim … or to put forward the case … or the facts which 
give rise to the claim are ‘inextricably linked with’ the illegality. The 
contrast is with a claim to which illegality is only ‘collateral’ or 
‘insignificant’ … or ‘incidental’. It is also acceptable that only part of a 
claim or loss is [sic] defeated by the maxim … 
10.55 Falling in line with the Court of Appeal’s statements in Siow 
Soon Kim v Lim Eng Beng [2004] SGCA 4, whenever the question of 
illegality arises, it is relevant to consider the parties’ intentions. 
10.56 Applying the rationale set out by Morris LJ in Brown Jenkinson 
& Co Ltd v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 621, Ang J observed 
(at [70]) that “an agreement made with the object (direct or indirect) of 
deceiving a third party is illegal”. In the present case, all the elements of 
the tort of deceit against a third party were present: the capital assets of 
Chenab were stated as being fully paid-up (when they were not); the 
allotment to Koon Seng Construction was a sham erected in order to 
deceive the PSA. For the learned judge, “[t]he two parties were, 
therefore, in pari delicto and neither could establish a cause of action 
against the other without relying on its own wrongdoing” (at [72]). 
10.57 In contrast with the English case of Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 
1 AC 340, the claim of Koon Seng Construction for reinstatement of its 
status as shareholder was not premised on any right of ownership of the 
Chenab shares apart from the allotment agreement. As the whole 
scheme was a “paper exercise”, Ang J found there to be no intention to 
pass property in the shares (at [76]). In summary (at [80]), Koon Seng 
Construction’s claim to be reinstated as a shareholder arose out of the 
unlawful conduct of the defendants in creating the sham appearance of 
Chenab being a company with a paid up capital of $1.5m to deceive the 
PSA. This was done with the connivance and participation of Koon Seng 
Construction. So both the relief sought by Koon Seng Construction, and 
the counterclaim sought by Chenab were substantially (and not 
collaterally or insignificantly) based on their unlawful conduct. Both 
claim and counterclaim, therefore, had to be dismissed. 
Moneylending transactions 
10.58 The vexed issue as to what amounts to an illegal moneylending 
transaction as to be rendered void under the Moneylenders Act 
(Cap 188, 1985 Rev Ed) (“MLA”) fell for consideration by the Court of 
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Appeal in Donald McArthy Trading Pte Ltd v Pankaj s/o Dhirajlal [2007] 
2 SLR 321, being an appeal from the decision of Kan Ting Chiu J in 
Pankaj s/o Dhirajlal v Donald McArthy Trading Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 79 
(discussed in (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 171 at paras 10.69–10.71). 
10.59 In this case, the respondent agreed to allow the first appellant to 
use his facilities with various banks for the issue of letters of credit 
(“L/C facilities”) to enable the first appellant to finance goods purchased 
by it. The first appellant became indebted to the respondent pursuant to 
this arrangement, and when the debts were not repaid, the respondent 
brought proceedings to recover the sums owed. Upholding Kan J’s 
decision (who had found in favour of the respondent), the Court of 
Appeal clarified that, “[t]he provisions of the MLA are not intended to 
apply to transactions made at arm’s length between commercial 
entities”; and that the courts should not adopt an over-extensive 
application of the MLA even if its provisions could be construed literally 
to cover most commercial situations (at [9], quoting with approval the 
analysis of V K Rajah J (as he then was) in City Hardware Pte Ltd v 
Kenrich Electronics Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 733). 
10.60 From that perspective, it was obvious that the respondent was 
not a moneylender within the terms of the MLA since the agreement 
between the first appellant and the respondent involved no loan of 
money, but was, on its face, a “loan or rental of credit facilities, 
specifically L/C facilities, which the respondent had obtained from his 
bankers” (at [13]). But was it in substance (though not in form) a 
moneylending transaction? For the reasons set out at [15]–[24], the 
Court of Appeal thought not. In concluding that the respondent had not 
loaned money to the first appellant in the first place, the Court of 
Appeal recognised that this form of mutually beneficial financial 
arrangement had (at [25]): 
… become a common an established practice among small business 
entities in Singapore … [and there was, therefore] no reason why the 
MLA should proscribe such ‘win-win’ solutions in the business sector 
when both parties are able to negotiate the terms of the transaction at 
arm’s length. Not only are these transactions not loans in nature or in 
form, they are also a convenient way to expand credit facilities in the 
market. 
Restraint of trade 
10.61 An unusual situation involving the validity of a restraint of 
trade clause arose in the case of Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark 
Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR 663. In this case, a “termination agreement” 
was entered into between the appellant company and the respondent 
(who had been its managing director and chief executive officer), after 
he had been instructed to resign and had been placed on garden leave 
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while serving out his notice period. The termination agreement was 
only executed after much negotiation between the parties, and provided, 
inter alia, that the respondent was prohibited, for a specified period, 
from soliciting the employment of certain persons in the employ of the 
appellant while himself in the employ of another (“cl C.1”); or 
participating in or rendering advice to a competitor “… anywhere in the 
world” (“cl C.3”). In consideration, the respondent would be paid a fee 
at a specified due date. Ultimately, however, the appellant refused to 
make payment, alleging that the respondent had acted in breach of these 
restraints on his freedom of action, leading to the present suit by the 
respondent for the sum owed to be paid. 
10.62 In the court below (reported as Wong Bark Chuan David v Man 
Financial (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 22), the trial judge found that the 
respondent was only in breach of cl C.3 but not cl C.1 as he was not in 
the employ of any competitor to the appellant at the time of the alleged 
solicitation. But this was immaterial, as the learned judge further ruled 
that both clauses were unreasonable restraints of trade and were thus 
invalid. Accordingly, after severing the two offending clauses from the 
agreement, he held that the consideration due under the termination 
agreement remained payable and found in favour of the respondent. 
10.63 The Court of Appeal agreed with the factual findings in the 
court below as to the breach of cl C.3, and as to its invalidity as being an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. This was so, since the appellant had 
failed to demonstrate the underlying legitimate proprietary interest 
which that clause might have been intended to protect, and further, its 
ambit was simply far too wide (at [15]). This was the case, even if one 
were to take the view that the termination agreement amounted to a 
settlement agreement, as “the doctrine of restraint of trade does apply to 
settlement agreements in general” (at [150]), unless the settlement 
agreement itself related to the settlement of a prior dispute over a 
restraint of trade covenant in an existing contract, and where the 
settlement agreement was not itself tainted by any vitiating factors 
(at [65]). 
10.64 However, the Court of Appeal was of the view that cl C.1 had in 
fact been breached by the respondent (at [18]). Nor was it invalid as 
being an illegal restraint of trade. Recognising that, in general, the two 
legitimate proprietary interests in the context of non-solicitation clauses 
like cl C.1 (being the interest to protect trade secrets and trade 
connections) were not directly in issue, the Court of Appeal noted that 
other legitimate proprietary interests might also exist. After reviewing 
English, Australian and various academic authorities, the Court of 
Appeal accepted that the interest of an employer in maintaining a stable, 
trained work force in a highly competitive environment could be a 
legitimate proprietary interest as would legitimise a non-solicitation 
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clause that would otherwise have been an unreasonable restraint of 
trade (at [94]–[105]), even in the absence of any protectable confidence 
(although this would affect the determination of the reasonableness of 
the non-solicitation clause in question – at [121]). In particular 
(at [110]): 
In our view, the scope (or, more accurately, the categories) of employees 
covered under a non-solicitation clause goes to the reasonableness of 
the clause concerned, which, in turn, depends on the precise factual 
matrix concerned. No blanket rule ought to be laid down, although we 
would agree that it would generally be more difficult to justify a non-
solicitation clause which covers the solicitation of just ‘any’ employee. 
… [W]e would think that if the non-solicitation clause concerned 
covers employees whose work entails very minimal (or even no) 
expertise and does not form an integral part of the employer’s 
operations, it would (absent extraordinary circumstances) be 
extremely difficult for the employer to justify the reasonableness of 
that particular clause … [emphasis in original] 
10.65 The key factor was the clause’s reasonableness in reference to 
the interests of the parties concerned and the interests of the public, 
such interests invariably having at least some connection and overlap (as 
Lord MacNaghten had pointed out in Thorsten Nordenfelt v The Maxim 
Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535, cited with 
approval at [145]). 
10.66 The Court of Appeal clarified, however, that the inclusion of 
clauses recording the parties’ prior agreement as to the reasonableness 
of the anti-solicitation clauses and other restraints of trade were wholly 
irrelevant to the inquiry as to whether such restraints of trade might be 
illegal and void (at [146]–[149]). Clause C.1 was, therefore, held to be 
valid, and had been breached by the respondent. Discussion of the 
consequences of this breach may be found at paras 10.76–10.77 below. 
Discharge of the contract 
Discharge by breach of a term 
10.67 The Court of Appeal took full advantage of the opportunity 
presented by the dispute in RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte 
Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 413 (“RDC Concrete”) to exhaustively set out how the 
question as to discharge in response to a breach of contract ought to be 
addressed. This was an appeal and cross-appeal from the decision of Lai 
Siu Chiu J (reported as Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd v RDC Concrete Pte Ltd 
[2006] SGHC 213; and discussed in (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 171 at 195–
197, paras 10.72–10.79). In summary, the plaintiff (“Sato Kogyo”) had 
contracted to purchase concrete from the defendant (“RDC”). The 
contract provided for the plaintiff to purchase around 70,000m3 of 
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concrete at contractually stipulated prices between 1 September 2003 to 
30 June 2006. On 5 April 2005, alleging non-payment of sums due, the 
defendant suspended supply of concrete. On 30 May 2005, the plaintiff 
terminated the contract because the defendant’s concrete had failed 
quality control requirements stipulated in the contract and also because 
of delay in its supply. 
10.68 Agreeing with the finding in the court below that the supply 
contract did not disentitle the defendant from supplying concrete to 
third parties and did not require the defendant to “prioritise” requests 
for supply under the contract by the plaintiff ahead of orders from third 
parties (at [25]–[32]), the Court of Appeal, nevertheless, came to very 
different conclusions on two issues. First, it held that on a proper 
construction of the contract, the plaintiff was entitled to recover “direct 
costs” arising from the defendant’s default in supply without first having 
to bring the contract to an end (at [39]–[41]); and second, such “direct 
costs” encompassed the price differentials paid by the plaintiff to third 
party concrete suppliers to make up shortfalls in supply by the 
defendant since such additional sums paid flowed directly and naturally 
from the defendant’s inability to supply concrete (at [42]–[45]). 
10.69 What is of more general interest, however, is the Court of 
Appeal’s summation of the approach to be taken in analysing the 
availability of the right to terminate a contract for breach. Delivering the 
grounds of decision of the Court of Appeal, Andrew Phang JA identified 
four distinct situations which could give rise to such a right  
(at [90]–[101]): 
(a) where the contract clearly and unambiguously provides 
for an event, the occurrence of which entitles the innocent party 
to elect to terminate the contract (“Situation 1”); 
(b) where there is no such provision, but where one 
contracting party renounces the contract, by words or conduct, 
so as to convey to the other contracting party that it will not 
perform its contractual obligations at all (“Situation 2”); 
(c) where there is no contractual provision for termination, 
but where the term which is breached may be identified as a 
condition, in particular, focussing on the question as to whether 
the intention of the parties to the contract was to designate the 
term breached as one that was so important that any breach, 
regardless of the consequences of the breach (“Situation 3(A)”); 
and 
(d) where there is no contractual provision for termination, 
in determining whether termination was available, the court 
would consider whether the nature and consequences of the 
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breach are such as to deprive the innocent party of substantially 
the whole of the benefit of the contract (“Situation 3(B)”). 
10.70 The Court of Appeal highlighted the potential tension between 
Situation 3(A) and Situation 3(B), and clarified that the two were not 
necessarily incompatible (at [102]), although it recognised that in 
certain cases, application of either approach would result in opposing 
conclusions. Reasoning, however, that since, “[i]n determining whether 
an innocent party is entitled to terminate a contract upon breach, the 
foremost consideration is (and must be) to give effect to the intentions of 
the contracting parties … the condition-warranty approach 
[ie Situation 3(A)] must take precedence over the Hongkong Fir approach 
[ie Situation 3(B)] because … it is premised on the intentions of the 
contracting parties themselves” [emphasis in original] (at [106]). 
Plainly, therefore, where the term breached is a condition, there is no 
need to consider application of the Hongkong Fir (Hongkong Fir 
Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26) approach. 
10.71 In a significant step, however, the Court of Appeal went further 
to address what should happen if the term breached was found to be a 
warranty. As the Court of Appeal said (at [107]): 
If … the term breached is a warranty, we are of the view that the 
innocent party is not thereby prevented from terminating the contract 
(as it would have been entitled so to do if the condition-warranty 
approach operated alone). Considerations of fairness demand, in our 
view, that the consequences of the breach should also be examined by 
the court, even if the term breached is only a warranty (as opposed to a 
condition). … [I]n a situation where the term breached would 
otherwise constitute a warranty … the court would, as a question of 
fairness, go further and examine the consequences of the breach as well. 
In the result, if the consequences of the breach are such as to deprive 
the innocent party of substantially the whole of the benefit that it was 
intended that the innocent party should obtain from the contract, 
then the innocent party would be entitled to terminate the contract, 
notwithstanding that it only constitutes a warranty. If, however, the 
consequences of the breach are only very trivial, then the innocent 
party would not be entitled to terminate the contract. [emphasis in 
original] 
10.72 Given the very last sentence in the above extract, without careful 
reading, one might then be concerned as to the residual utility of the 
concept of a warranty. This is addressed by the Court of Appeal 
(at [108]): 
It is true that the approach adopted in the preceding paragraph would, 
in effect, result in the concept of the warranty, as we know it, being 
effectively effaced since there would virtually never be a situation in 
which there would be a term, the breach of which would always result 
in only trivial circumstances. In other words, if a term was not a 
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condition under the condition-warranty approach, it would 
necessarily become an intermediate term, subject to the Hongkong Fir 
approach … [emphasis in original] 
10.73 These comments echo the observations of Upjohn LJ in 
Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 
2 QB 26 itself, in particular, at 64: 
In my judgment the remedies open to the innocent party for breach of 
a stipulation which is not a condition strictly so called, depend entirely 
upon the nature of the breach and its foreseeable consequences. 
Breaches of stipulation fall, naturally, into two classes. First there is the 
case where the owner by his conduct indicates that he considers 
himself no longer bound to perform his part of the contract; in that 
case, of course, the charterer may accept the repudiation and treat the 
contract as at an end. The second class of case is, of course, the more 
usual one and that is where, due to misfortune such as the perils of the 
sea, engine failures, incompetence of the crew and so on, the owner is 
unable to perform a particular stipulation precisely in accordance with 
the terms of the contract try he never so hard to remedy it. In that case 
the question to be answered is, does the breach of the stipulation go so 
much to the root of the contract that it makes further commercial 
performance of the contract impossible, or in other words is the whole 
contract frustrated? If yea, the innocent party may treat the contract as 
at an end. If nay, his claim sounds in damages only. 
10.74 But it is important to note, first, that these observations do not 
relate to cases where the term in question is treated in law as a warranty 
by dint of case authority or statutory provision. Second, these 
observations were made in the context where the parties had not made it 
abundantly clear that the term in question was not to entail any right of 
discharge on breach. It is respectfully suggested that these two matters 
were not fully considered by the court, and therefore, some care should 
be taken not to read this aspect of the decision too broadly. 
10.75 As to the latter point, the passage in RDC Concrete at [108] of 
the court’s grounds of decision is carefully silent on what is to happen 
where the contracting parties have explicitly provided that breach of the 
term in question is not to entitle the innocent party any right of election 
to discharge the contract. But by parity of reasoning, if one disregards 
the consequences of a breach where the parties have intended the term in 
question to operate as a condition, it is unclear why one should not 
similarly disregard such consequences where the parties have intended 
the term to operate as a mere warranty (and, mutatis mutandis, where 
case authority or statute may have designated the term in question as a 
warranty). Arguably, notwithstanding the express language used in the 
decision, it is implicit in both passages set out above that before one 
moves on to apply the Hongkong Fir approach to the term in question, 
that term must also have been found not to have been intended by the 
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parties (or, for that matter, decreed as a matter of case law or statutory 
authority) to be a term for which discharge of the contract was 
envisaged. But, the question remains open for future clarification, given 
that this part of the decision is plainly obiter dicta, albeit dicta of great 
persuasive weight. 
10.76 Given the centrality of the need to ascertain party intentions as 
to the status of the terms in a contract, some additional clarification as 
to how this is done was provided by the Court of Appeal in Man 
Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David [2007] SGCA 53. 
Having addressed its mind on the issue as to illegality (discussed above 
at paras 10.61–10.66), the Court of Appeal reiterated the points it had 
made in RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 413 
before outlining the factors which were relevant in ascertaining whether 
a given term was a condition (at [162]–[173]). Even so, it recognised 
that where none of those considerations specified were strictly 
applicable (as was the case on the facts before it), it remained open to 
the court to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties with 
regard to the term in question by construing the contract in light of the 
surrounding circumstances as a whole (at [179]). 
10.77 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal held that that clause was 
intended by the parties to be a condition, being an integral part of an 
important cluster of clauses, compliance with which was a precondition 
to receipt of the consideration set out in the contract (at [188]). It 
followed, therefore, that breach of that clause entitled the appellant to 
discharge the contract. 
Discharge by frustration 
10.78 Usefully emphasising the exceptional nature of discharge by 
frustration, the Court of Appeal held in Lee Chee Wei v Tan Hor Peow 
Victor [2007] 3 SLR 537 (“Lee Chee Wei”) that the failure to have the 
shares in question listed was not a frustrating event so as to discharge 
the contract. Thus, V K Rajah J, in delivering the judgment of the court, 
held (at [48]): 
To establish that a frustrating event has occurred is always an uphill 
task, and rightly so, in order that legitimate commercial expectations 
may be preserved and protected. Parties to a contract can always guard 
against vagaries or unforeseen contingencies through express 
stipulation and should they voluntarily choose to accept and 
undertake an absolute and unconditional obligation, they forfeit the 
right to complain if events do not unfold as planned. Imprudent 
commercial bargains cannot be aborted or modified merely because of 
an adverse change of circumstances. 
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10.79 What is most significant, however, lies in the preceding 
paragraph of the judgment. The court emphasised (at [47]) that: 
The effect of a possible failure to obtain listing by the completion date 
would surely have been duly considered by the parties. Having held 
executive positions and directorships in various companies, the 
defendants were more than adequately experienced and savvy and it 
would be ludicrous for them to insist that they had never properly 
contemplated the risk or the possibility of a failure to list [the 
company in question]. [emphasis added] 
10.80 This short passage is significant because it demonstrates that in 
ascertaining whether the purported frustrating event is, indeed, such, 
one does not take an objective view of the parties’ reasonable 
expectations as to the possible occurrence of such event. The test is 
subjective. That is, the court must endeavour to establish whether the 
parties to the contract did reasonably contemplate the risk or possibility 
that the purported frustrating event might occur. If such a finding is 
made (as was the case in Lee Chee Wei), that event cannot be said to be a 
frustrating event as to discharge the contract so as to excuse its non-
performance. Read strictly, these two passages do not, it is admitted, lay 
the possibility of an objective test of reasonable contemplation to rest – 
but the extract of the judgment in para 10.79 above is certainly support 
for the proposition that it is the subjective test which has been applied 
by the courts. 
Frustration and force majeure 
10.81 Apart from dealing with the question of discharge by breach, 
the Court of Appeal in RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd 
[2007] 4 SLR 413 reiterated the significance of reasonable foreseeability 
within the context of frustration and force majeure. On the facts, as the 
defence of force majeure had not been specifically pleaded by the 
defendant to excuse their non-performance of their obligations to 
supply concrete to the plaintiff (on account of shortages in raw 
materials and plant breakdowns), it was not strictly necessary for the 
court to address these issues. However, given the dearth of local case law 
on point, the Court of Appeal saw fit to set out a number of general 
principles: 
(a) First, it emphasised that the principal purpose of a force 
majeure clause was to contractually allocate the risks in the 
performance of a contract between the contracting parties with 
regard to the occurrence of certain contractually specified 
events. Therefore, the first task before the court in such a 
situation would be to construe the force majeure clause  
(at [53]–[54]). 
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(b) Second, building on the reasoning adopted by a 
differently constituted Court of Appeal in Glahe International 
Expo AG v ACS Computer Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR 620, the court 
observed that whereas a force majeure clause was an agreement 
as to how outstanding obligations were to be resolved upon the 
onset of a foreseeable event, the doctrine of frustration 
concerned how contractual obligations were to be treated from 
the onset of an unforeseeable event (at [56]). 
(c) Third, notwithstanding that difference, the principles 
relating to the doctrine of frustration were still relevant to the 
construction and interpretation of force majeure clauses in that, 
“by their very nature and function, force majeure clauses would – 
in the ordinary course of events – be triggered only where there 
was a radical external event that supervened and that was not 
due to the fault of either of the contracting parties” (at [57]). 
Further, although the court accepted that there could be force 
majeure clauses, the terms of which might fall short of such 
criteria, it was of the view that, “this would not be common, 
especially if one accepts the basic premise that the doctrine of 
frustration centres (in large part at least) on the absence of 
reasonable control on the part of the contracting parties” 
(at [57]). This is notable, for it indicates that there may well be a 
judicial predisposition to refuse to treat a clause excusing non-
performance for reasons which were neither a radical 
supervening event nor independent of fault of the contracting 
parties as a force majeure clause. 
(d) Fourth, given that the effect of a force majeure clause 
would be to exclude the operation of the doctrine of frustration 
in relation to the nature of the relief to be given to the non-
performing party, it behoved the parties to make clear and 
unambiguous provision as to when such clause would be 
triggered; and that the court would construe such clauses 
strictly (at [60]–[63]). 
(e) Fifth, a party relying on a force majeure clause would 
also have to demonstrate that it had taken “all reasonable steps 
to avoid its operation, or mitigate its results” (at [64]). 
(f) Last, if pleaded, the burden lay on the party seeking to 
rely on a force majeure clause to prove that it fell squarely within 
the ambit of that clause (at [65]). 
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Remedies 
Remoteness of consequential losses arising from settlement of 
downstream claims in back-to-back sales contracts 
10.82 In Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 
4 SLR 855, the Court of Appeal addressed the issue as to when a court 
should uphold a settlement against a third party to that settlement 
process. As V K Rajah JA observed (at [3]): 
Must the courts choose only between two stark choices, ie, the principle 
that a party must prove its losses by establishing through direct 
evidence what its precise losses are on the one hand and the 
pragmatism that encourages the courts to support the sensible extra-
judicial resolution of disputes on the other? Is it not open to the courts 
to approach the resolution of such a conundrum with principled 
pragmatism? [emphasis in original] 
10.83 The respondent purchased capacitors from the appellant and 
resold them to a third party who, in turn, installed the capacitors onto 
printed circuit boards for a fourth party. However, the capacitors were 
counterfeit. The fourth party obtained indemnification by the third 
party for its expenses in purging these counterfeit capacitors from the 
printed circuit boards supplied. The third party then sought 
compensation from the respondent – and after negotiations, the sum of 
US$300,000 was paid to the third party in full and final settlement of all 
claims by the third party against the respondent. During the 
negotiations, the respondent sought to involve the appellant, seeking a 
contribution from it towards the settlement amount. These approaches 
were ignored. Ultimately, the respondent claimed the settlement sum of 
US$300,000 it had paid to the third party, as well as US$2,184 as loss of 
profits. 
10.84 On 20 March 2006, both parties entered into a consent 
judgment by which the appellant admitted liability for the damage 
caused. This left only the issue of quantum of damages for the court’s 
assessment. At first instance, the assistant registrar allowed the 
respondent’s claim in full (Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd v Britestone 
Pte Ltd [2006] SGHC 186). On appeal, though no longer disputing its 
liability for the respondent’s loss of profit, the appellant disputed its 
liability for the US$300,000 settlement sum. On appeal to Tan Lee 
Meng J (reported as Smith & Associates Far East Ltd v Britestone Pte Ltd 
[2007] 1 SLR 958; [2006] SGHC 238), Tan J upheld the assessment of 
the assistant registrar. Still dissatisfied, a final appeal to the Court of 
Appeal was brought, first, on the basis that the losses claimed were too 
remote as the appellant had had no notice of the use to which the 
capacitors were to be put; and second, whether the settlement sum was a 
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reasonable one as to be capable of being taken to reflect the respondent’s 
actual loss. 
10.85 On this, the Court of Appeal noted (at [12]) that the assistant 
registrar had found it to be surely within the appellant’s contemplation 
that the capacitors might be sold from customer to customer, and 
ultimately be used in relation to a printed circuit board, as had Tan J. 
At [14], V K Rajah JA cited Tan J’s judgment in the court below with 
approval: 
In the present case, the capacitors sold by Britestone to Smith became 
an ‘integral’ part of the printed circuit boards … The fact that it was 
[the third party] and not [the respondent] who fixed the capacitors 
onto the printed circuit boards should not matter in the circumstances 
of the case, and especially so since the testimony of [the respondent’s 
representative] that the capacitors sold by [the appellant] to [the 
respondent] had no use other than to be installed onto printed circuit 
boards was not contradicted by [the appellant]. [emphasis in original] 
10.86 The appellant’s objection based on remoteness of loss, therefore, 
fared no better before the Court of Appeal. As V K Rajah JA elaborated 
(at [18]): 
Bearing in mind the fact that the capacitors could only be used on 
printed circuit boards, it must surely have been within the appellant’s 
reasonable contemplation that the capacitors would be used in such a 
manner by the respondent. 
10.87 As to the second issue, the Court of Appeal took the view that 
the position in England and Australia was consistent, that as a first step, 
the court should consider the reasonableness of settlements in 
determining whether such settlements could be treated as evidencing 
the actual loss suffered (at [30]). It clarified, however, that there was no 
evidential presumption that business settlements were made reasonably 
(at [31]). 
10.88 Once the issue of liability was resolved and no longer in issue, 
what factors might the court take into consideration as establishing the 
“reasonableness” of downstream settlements? To this end, the Court of 
Appeal set out a conceptual framework of the various factors, albeit in 
broad, non-exhaustive terms. In summary (at [54]): 
When a downstream claimant seeks to subsequently rely on an earlier 
settlement as reflecting the actual loss which he now claims against an 
upstream defendant, the courts should usually consider the following 
matters in determining whether he has acted as a responsible and 
reasonable businessman in arriving at the settlement: 
(a) the duration or period of negotiations as well as their general 
content; 
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(b) whether there are any customs of trade or previous business 
dealings between the parties and/or whether there are any 
legitimate business considerations or contractual requirements 
(eg, dispute resolution clauses, etc) enjoining a settlement ; 
(c) whether the negotiations were conducted bona fide; 
(d) the assessment which could properly be made at the time of 
settlement of the prospects of success or failure of the claim 
based on materials then available; 
(e) the availability of and/or reliance on legal advice, expert advice 
or independent survey reports taking into account 
considerations of cost and time; 
(f) whether the actual settlement itself was arrived at arm’s length; 
(g) whether there was an opportunity accorded to the third 
party/ultimate payee to be involved in the negotiations; 
(h) whether there was a positive reception of complaints by the 
third party/ultimate payee; 
(i) whether the settlement amount has been paid, and, if so, how 
and when; 
(j) the bargaining strengths of the parties involved in the 
settlement, taking into account (among other things) alternative 
means by which the dispute could have been concluded; 
(k) whether, in the round, the settlement figure was objectively 
assessed and properly calibrated against the context of the entire 
factual matrix; and 
(l) the practical consequences of the decision on reasonableness. 
10.89 These factors were to be assessed in a holistic fashion, being 
neither exhaustive nor anything other than a rough-and-ready practical 
guide to give effect to the broad policy to encourage settlements without 
insisting on technical and arid assessment of each item of evidence 
(at [55]). 
10.90 On the matter before it, the burden lay on the respondent, 
prima facie, to establish on a balance of probabilities that its settlement 
with the third party was reasonable. This it had done (details of which 
are set out at [62]). The burden, thus, moved to the appellant to show 
that the settlement was not reasonable (at [61]); and on careful 
consideration of the evidence, the Court of Appeal found that there was 
absolutely no basis for the appellant to argue that the settlement was not 
a genuine arm’s length settlement and was unreasonable (at [65]). 
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Damages on the “broad ground” 
10.91 Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chia Kok Leong v 
Prosperland Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR 484 (upholding the decision of 
Prakash J in Prosperland Pte Ltd v Chia Kok Leong [2004] 4 SLR 129), it 
seems well accepted that where a defendant has contracted with a 
plaintiff to perform certain contractual works on a subject property as 
to which the plaintiff has no proprietary interest, there is no basis to 
assert that such plaintiff is not a proper party to bring an action on that 
contract should the defendant be in breach thereof. The specific issue 
which was dealt with by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in this 
connection was whether the plaintiff in such a case was entitled to 
recover substantial damages even though the plaintiff had no 
proprietary interest in the subject property, and therefore could be said 
to have suffered “no loss”. The ratio in both, was that the plaintiff could 
do so, on the basis of the so-called “narrow ground” or “Albazero 
exception” enabling the plaintiff to recover substantial damages, even 
while accepting that such recovery was not in respect of any loss suffered 
by the plaintiff, but was rather in compensation for losses suffered by a 
third party to the contract, namely, the present owner of the subject 
property. 
10.92 As an alternative basis in response to the preliminary issue 
which had been posed before them, both the High Court and the Court 
of Appeal adverted to the possibility of using the “broad ground” to 
justify the award of substantial damages to the plaintiff in such a case. In 
obiter dicta, Andrew Ang J has provided some further clarification as to 
what might be recovered under the broad ground. 
10.93 In Seah Boon Lock v Family Food Court [2007] 3 SLR 362 (see 
also para 10.10 above on “Formalities”), Ang J was posed with the 
question as to whether the first plaintiff, acting as agent of an 
undisclosed principal (said to be the first plaintiff ’s wife and who had 
been joined as the second plaintiff in the action) who had entered into a 
licence with the defendant to operate a food stall, was entitled to recover 
substantial damages when that licence was wrongfully terminated. 
Having found that the termination of the lease by the defendant was 
wrongful, the question arose as to the appropriate remedy in damages. 
10.94 Complications arose because Ang J found that the second 
plaintiff was not the undisclosed principal to whom the first plaintiff 
was agent. As matters before the court stood, the precise identity of the 
first plaintiff ’s principal was unknown. This, the court recognised, could 
create an anomalous situation whereby the first plaintiff might, as a 
party to the contract with the defendant (albeit as an agent of an 
undisclosed and unidentified principal), be unable to claim against the 
defendant even if the defendant was clearly in breach of the contract. 
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Nevertheless, Ang J concluded that the non-joinder of the first plaintiff ’s 
undisclosed principal was immaterial. 
10.95 The primary basis for this was Ang J’s holding, after reviewing 
the authorities (at [61]–[75]), that it was, “an established proposition 
that the agent has a right to sue the third party [to the agency 
relationship] because he does so as a party to the contract [between 
himself and the third party]” (at [75]). 
10.96 Next, the learned judge found that the principal’s loss was not 
idiosyncratic – rather, it was an objectively assessable loss which was 
within the contemplation of the contracting parties (at [97]–[99]) for it 
was clear to the defendant from the outset that it was dealing with a 
family business unit (of which the first plaintiff was a part) and that 
losses arising from breach of the contract would be suffered by that unit. 
So it was disingenuous for the defendant to claim that it did not 
contemplate that the losses arising from breach of the agreement would 
fall on, “some permutation of Seah [the first plaintiff], Wee [the second 
plaintiff], or the companies they controlled” (at [99]). 
10.97 But even though the plaintiffs’ case had not pleaded for 
damages on the basis of the broad ground, strictly speaking, there was 
no call for the court to examine the point. But for completeness’ sake, in 
obiter dicta, Ang J sought to examine the applicability of the “broad 
ground” discussed in Chia Kok Leong v Prosperland Pte Ltd [2005] 
2 SLR 484 had it been pleaded. A few points were made. 
10.98 First, Ang J clarified (at [106]–[107]) that the broad ground was 
available to a plaintiff even where this might expose the defendant to 
liability for substantial loss to both the plaintiff as well as the third party 
who had suffered the “actual” loss, noting that such restriction was 
nowhere to be found in the Court of Appeal’s analysis in Chia Kok Leong 
v Prosperland Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR 484 (“Chia Kok Leong”). Second, it 
had to be kept in mind that the formulation of the broad ground 
encapsulated only the plaintiff ’s performance interest in the contract 
(at [109]). The learned judge quoted with approval Chia Kok Leong 
where the Court of Appeal said (Chia Kok Leong at [53]) “the basis on 
which a plaintiff is entitled to claim for substantial damages under the 
broad ground is that he did not receive what he had bargained and paid 
for”. [emphasis in original] That is to say, “[t]he only loss which can be 
claimed by the party not receiving the bargain he contracted for is the 
performance loss and nothing else” [emphasis in original] (Seah Boon 
Lock at [110]). To substantiate his loss on the broad ground, had it been 
pleaded, the first plaintiff would have had to adduce evidence of the 
difference in the cost between obtaining shop premises of similar size 
and traffic as opposed to the one which ought to have been provided by 
the defendant, and not the first plaintiff ’s loss of profits from operating 
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the food stall (at [108]). Such “loss of profits” could not be considered as 
a loss under the broad ground, “for the simple reason that the 
contracting party [the first plaintiff] was never in any position to make 
any profits in the first place. If he had been, then he could have claimed 
substantial damages without resorting to the ‘broad ground’ at all” 
(at [112]). 
Damages for loss of a chance 
10.99 In the case of Asia Hotel Investments Ltd v Starwood Asia Pacific 
Management Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 661, a majority in the Court of 
Appeal held that the appellant, Asia Hotel Investments (“Asia Hotels”), 
was entitled to bring a claim against the respondent, Starwood Asia 
Pacific Management (“Starwood”), for having caused it to suffer the loss 
of a chance to acquire a majority stake in a company (the “Lai Sun 
stake”) which owned a hotel property situated in central Bangkok, the 
Grand Pacific Hotel (“GPH”). The facts underlying the dispute and a 
discussion of the Court of Appeal’s decision may be found in (2004) 
5 SAL Ann Rev 198 at paras 9.109–9.127. In Asia Hotel Investments Ltd v 
Starwood Asia Pacific Management Pte Ltd [2007] SGHC 50, it fell to Lai 
Siu Chiu J to conduct the assessment of damages for this loss. 
10.100 To begin with, certain passages in the learned judge’s grounds of 
decision may require a modicum of circumspection. Lai J summarised 
the holding of the majority in the Court of Appeal as follows: 
19 The plaintiff appealed against Tan J’s decision (in Civil 
Appeal No 143 of 2003). By a majority decision (Yong Pung How CJ 
dissenting), the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff ’s appeal (see 
report at [2005] 1 SLR 661) and held: 
(a) Tan J had erred in treating the plaintiff ’s lack of progress in its 
negotiations with Lai Sun and with financial institutions as 
important in determining whether the loss by the plaintiff of the 
chance to acquire the Lai Sun stake was caused by the breach. 
The plaintiff knew that to successfully wrap up the deal to 
purchase the Lai Sun stake, the most critical factor was an 
international hotel operator with a five-star brand. Having 
locked the defendants in for a year up to 4 December 2002 
through the [non-compete agreement], the plaintiff knew that it 
had up to that same day to sew things up. Hence, the plaintiff 
was not as anxious as it should have been when Lai Sun refused 
to extend the first MOU and when it knew that the Narulas 
would be a competitor. 
(b) The objective facts showed that the Narulas needed the 
defendants as the operator of GPH. The defendants’ acts helped 
the Narulas to acquire the Lai Sun stake. The evidential burden 
of disproving that shifted to the defendants to show that the 
Narulas could have proceeded with the acquisition without the 
(2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 187 
 
help of the defendants and the defendants did not discharge this 
evidential burden. 
(c) Once causation had been established for loss of a chance, all that 
was needed to be shown was that the chance which was lost was 
real and substantial. What would constitute a real or substantial 
chance need not be proved on a balance of probabilities. 
10.101 With respect, para (c) may be an over-simplification of the 
majority’s reasoning. As was teased out in the discussion of the 
reasoning of the majority in the Court of Appeal’s decision in (2004) 
5 SAL Ann Rev 201: 
9.118 In the opinion of Chao Hick Tin JA (delivering the judgment 
of the majority in the Court of Appeal), this case fell within the … 
category [of] cases where the plaintiff ’s loss would depend on the 
hypothetical action of a third party, either independently or in 
addition to the plaintiff ’s own action. In so far as proof of the third 
part’s actions was concerned, it was enough for the plaintiff to prove 
that there was a ‘substantial chance rather than a speculative one’ … It 
was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the third party would have acted in such a manner 
as to confer the plaintiff the benefit in question … It was also not 
necessary for such a plaintiff to show on a balance of probabilities that 
the chance would have come to fruition. 
10.102 The majority’s reasoning in the Court of Appeal does not, 
therefore, go so far as to accept proof of what might constitute a real or 
substantial chance (of success in acquiring the Lai Sun stake) on a 
standard of proof less than the usual standard of a balance of 
probabilities. Quite otherwise: the party claiming such loss must still 
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he had a real or substantial 
chance of acquiring the Lai Sun stake. In establishing such proof, in so 
far as that chance would depend on the actions of a third party, there 
was no need to prove (on a balance of probabilities) that the third party 
would have acted in such a manner as to ensure a successful acquisition. 
So long as there was a real and substantial chance that it might do so, 
that would be enough. 
10.103 In so far as the assessment of the damage caused to Asia Hotels 
as a result of Starwood’s actions resulting in Asia Hotels losing the 
chance of a successful acquisition of the Lai Sun stake was concerned, 
Lai J identified (at [32]) three components that Asia Hotels would have 
had to achieve in order to acquire the Lai Sun stake: (a) obtain sufficient 
financing for the acquisition (“the financing element”); (b) obtain 
shareholder consent for the sale of the Lai Sun stake (“the shareholder 
element”); and (c) obtain the defendants’ approval to conclude the hotel 
management agreement (“the management element”). 
10.104 The learned judge then proceeded to observe as follows: 
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33 The crux boils down to the interaction between the three 
elements above. What weight should be ascribed to each of those three 
elements? It is only after the issue of the relative weight of the three 
elements is determined, that one is better able to determine the extent 
of the chance. Without determining the proportion to be ascribed to 
each of these three elements, there is a risk of placing undue emphasis 
on one of the elements, at the expense of the others. It also bears 
remembering that assessment of damages is an art, never an exact 
science. 
34 Having evaluated the evidence, I am of the view that an 
appropriate apportionment of weight between the three elements 
would be: 
(a) financing element – 40%; 
(b) shareholder element – 30%; and 
(c) management element – 30%. 
… 
36 Ultimately, the extent of the chance which I will eventually 
determine will be the sum total of the product between the weights 
attached to each of the three elements (eg, 40% for the financing 
element) and my assessment of the likelihood of the plaintiff ’s 
securing that particular element. … 
10.105 The assessment of damages is, as the learned judge observed, 
“an art, never an exact science” (at [33]). The learned judge assessed the 
likelihood of successfully resolving each of financing, shareholder and 
management elements to be 10%, 60% and 40% (at [99], [115], [148], 
respectively). But rather than proceed to the assessment of the damage 
done to Asia Hotels on the basis of these percentages alone, the learned 
judge proceeded to apply a discount to these percentages by reference to 
the “weightage” as to their significance to the successful completion of 








Financing element 10% 40% 4% (10% x 40%) 
Shareholder 
element 
60% 30% 18% (60% x 30%) 
Management 
element 
40% 30% 12% (40% x 30%) 
10.106 The details of the complex financial calculations as to the 
plaintiff ’s investment gains had it been able to successfully carry out its 
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scheme of acquisition are far beyond the remit of this summary. But the 
learned judge ultimately found that the net present value of the hotel, 
had it been acquired, was THB325,997,077 (or about US$8.15m). As the 
learned judge noted (at [476]), this was “only half of the equation in 
assessing the plaintiff ’s damages” since the court still had to “attribute 
the loss of chance to the figure of THB325,997,077 to take into account 
the fact that the plaintiff ’s loss, at the end of the day, is merely a loss of 
chance and not the actual loss of profits.” Adopting the analysis as the 
percentage of chances above, the learned judge awarded the sum of 
THB110,839,006 to the plaintiff with interest from the date of the writ, 
being the product of the value of the investment and the value of the 
chance to successfully make that investment. (At [39]–[42], Lai J clearly 
explained the basis of the court’s power to award damages in foreign 
currencies, and the reasons for doing so in the present case.) 
10.107 A slight difficulty arises out of the learned judge’s assessment of 
the value of the chance that had been lost by Asia Hotels. The value of 
the chance was, in Lai J’s judgment, the sum of the chance of the 
discounted financing, shareholder and management elements falling in 
place (ie, the 4%, 18% and 12% figures set out in the fourth column in 
the table above). Accordingly, the learned judge assessed the value of the 
chance lost by Asia Hotels to be 34% (being the sum of 4%, 18% and 
12%). 
10.108 Two points may be made here. The first is mathematical. Say 
outcome X occurs only when events P, Q and R all occur. A simple 
example would be a bet to pay $1,000 to anyone who throws three coins 
simultaneously and manages to get all of them to show “heads”. Here, 
there is a 50% chance of each coin turning out to be “heads”. However, 
the probability that one might get all three coins to show “heads” 
simultaneously is not the sum of the probabilities of each coin coming 
up “heads” (ie, 50% + 50% + 50% = 150%, or ½ + ½ + ½ = 1½). That is 
obviously untenable since it would give us a figure in excess of absolute 
certainty. Rather, the probability that one might get three “heads” at the 
same time in a single throw is the product of the probability that each 
coin might turn up heads (ie, 50% x 50% x 50% = 12.5%, or ½ x ½ x ½ 
= 1/8). That is, one has a one in eight chance of getting the $1,000. 
10.109 The same is true for the derivation of the probabilities of 
occurrence of other kinds of events, such as the probability (or chance) 
that Asia Hotels might have successfully acquired the Lai Sun stake. 
Following the reasoning above, this should be derived as the product of 
the probabilities of a successful outcome in relation to the financing, 
shareholder and management elements. 
10.110 The second point of note relates to Lai J’s weighting of the 
financing, shareholder and management elements. As noted above, the 
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end-result of this weighting exercise was to discount the “likelihood of 
securing” success in each of the financing, shareholder and management 
elements. With respect, this may have been one refinement too many. 
10.111 For the Lai Sun stake to be successfully acquired, all three 
elements as identified by the learned judge would have had to be 
successfully concluded. Failure in respect of any one of these three 
elements would have resulted in failure of the acquisition. Lai J was 
concerned (at [33]) that, “without determining the proportion to be 
ascribed to each of these three elements, there is a risk of placing undue 
emphasis on one of the elements, at the expense of the others.” But it is 
unclear what Lai J sought to achieve by placing greater weight on the 
financing element. 
10.112 As the learned judge said (at [35]): 
… the financing element stood out from the other two because it had 
a greater force in determining whether the plaintiff was going to clinch 
the Lai Sun stake. It was also the one element on which [Asia Hotels] 
had to do the most work in order to seal the deal with Lai Sun. To that 
end, I thought it was fair and reasonable to place on it a greater weight, 
albeit only slightly more, than the other two elements. 
10.113 As to the latter, surely the difficulty of the task would go to the 
percentage likelihood of successfully negotiating the financing element, 
a matter already taken into account in the 10% probability figure 
arrived at later (at [99])? 
10.114 As to the former, it is not precisely clear how it could be said 
that the financing element could have a “greater force” in determining 
Asia Hotels’ success in clinching the Lai Sun stake since, as observed 
earlier, all three elements would have had to be successfully resolved in 
order for Asia Hotels to clinch the Lai Sun stake. Perhaps Lai J was 
obliquely suggesting that the three elements were not independent of 
each other, that success in obtaining financing would, perhaps, increase 
the probability of success in the shareholder and management elements. 
But if so, it is not immediately obvious that the application of weights to 
the seemingly independently derived probabilities of success in the 
financing, shareholder and management elements (namely the 10%, 
60% and 40% figures, at [99], [115], [148], respectively) accurately 
reflects that relationship of interdependence. The precise rationale for 
weighting the importance of the financing, shareholder and 
management elements, and the application of the discount to the 
findings as to the probability of successful resolution of these three 
elements is, therefore, unclear. 
10.115 Given that the financing, shareholder and management 
elements were equally important to the acquisition, and that a successful 
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acquisition could only be obtained if there was a successful result for 
each of these elements, on the assumption that each of the elements is 
independent of the outcome of the others, it would seem that the 
probability or chance of a successful outcome would simply be the 
product of the likelihoods of securing a successful outcome for each of 
these three elements. Other than the exceedingly oblique reference at 
[35], perhaps, to the interdependence of the chances of success in 
relation to the shareholder and management elements at [35], there is 
little else to suggest that the court thought them to be anything other 
than independent of each other. 
Proof of damage 
10.116 A dramatic example of the severe consequences of failing to 
tender evidence of damage arising out of a breach of contract arose in 
the case of Abe Isaac (Pte) Ltd v Marieta Montalba Pacudan [2007] 
SGHC 46. The dispute arose over the non-performance of various 
contractual obligations contained in a lease of commercial premises by 
the defendant-tenant upon the expiration of the lease, thereby causing, 
allegedly, loss to the plaintiff-landlord. Apart from other difficulties with 
the plaintiff ’s case, in relation to that part of its claim based on the non-
return of various items specified in an inventory list annexed to the 
lease, Judicial Commissioner Sundaresh Menon noted, “[t]he burden of 
proof as to liability as well as quantum is on the plaintiff. The fact that 
the plaintiff failed to adduce any credible evidence as to the damage it 
sustained was fatal to its case” (at [50]). 
10.117 In relation to the landlord’s claim for the value of various items 
which were to have been returned on the expiration of the lease, the 
failure of the landlord to provide any credible evidence as to the damage 
sustained from such non-return (on the basis of the cost of replacing 
such missing items) compelled the submission of an alternate basis of 
assessment, being the depreciated cost of the said items. In her closing 
submissions, counsel suggested that an appropriate method for such 
depreciation might be gleaned from a taxation ruling issued by the 
Australian government. The learned Judicial Commissioner noted, 
however, that such damage was neither pleaded, nor led in evidence, nor 
argued. Nor was any explanation offered as to why the depreciation 
method used by the Australian Tax Authorities was relevant. But most of 
all, “in the absence of an acceptable starting point, it is irrelevant to 
speak of depreciation” (at [53]). 
10.118 There being no evidence as to the quantum of loss on this head 
of claim, following the analysis set out by Thean J in L & M 
Airconditioning & Refrigeration (Pte) Ltd v S A Shee & Co (Pte) Ltd 
[1993] 3 SLR 482, since this was a case where the fact of loss had been 
shown but the necessary evidence as to its amount was not given, 
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nominal damages might be awarded (at [54]). Further, as had been the 
case in Permasteelisa Pacific Holdings Ltd v Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction Co Ltd [2005] 2 SLR 270, since there had been no 
bifurcation of the hearing between issues of liability and quantum, and 
the plaintiff-landlord had had the opportunity to adduce such evidence 
as he wished on quantum, there could be no further opportunity for 
further evidence on quantum upon the court’s rejection of such 
evidence as had been led (at [55]). Given this state of affairs, the learned 
Judicial Commissioner ordered nominal damages of $200 in respect of 
the claim based on non-return of the items set out in the inventory list. 
10.119 The plaintiff-landlord’s claim as to damage suffered in light of 
the failure of the defendant-tenant to reinstate the premises fared no 
better. No expert surveyor had been invited to provide a report as to 
such costs, and the only evidence adduced (which was rejected by the 
court) was a rough estimate prepared by the contractor who had been 
asked by the plaintiff-landlord to provide a quotation of the necessary 
works for reinstatement. Accordingly, and for the same reasons as for 
the other head of claim, nominal damages of $200 were awarded in 
relation to the damage caused by the defendant-tenant’s non-
reinstatement of the premises. 
Remedies in the alternative: specific performance and damages 
10.120 Given the Court of Appeal’s decision that the contract had been 
breached and not frustrated (discussed above at paras 10.78–10.80), the 
next issue in Lee Chee Wei v Tan Hor Peow Victor [2007] 3 SLR 537 was 
the appropriate remedy for the defendant’s breach of contract. The 
difficulty arose because the trial had been conducted almost exclusively 
with an eye to having the contract specifically performed. Declining to 
interfere with the decision in the court below not to exercise its 
discretion to grant specific performance, the Court of Appeal stated that 
it was persuaded, based on the facts, that damages were sufficient to 
restore the plaintiff to the position he would have enjoyed had the 
contract been performed (at [56]). 
10.121 The following passages in the Court of Appeal judgment do, 
with respect, have to be read with some care. At [57], the court noted 
that “[t]he next and perhaps most pertinent issue is the trial judge’s 
refusal to grant the plaintiff damages in lieu of specific performance.” 
Reading this in the context of the judgment as a whole, it is plain that 
the Court of Appeal did not have in mind the kind of damages it is 
empowered to award pursuant to s 18(2) read with para 14 of the First 
Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 
2007 Rev Ed). That is to say, the Court of Appeal was not concerned 
with what in England would have been termed “damages pursuant to 
Lord Cairns’ Act”. Given its agreement with the court below that 
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damages were adequate so as to rule out exercise of the court’s 
discretion to grant specific performance, the court was really concerned 
with the question as to whether damages, in the alternative, could be 
awarded, even though the plaintiff had left out the words “to be 
assessed” as part of his pleading. 
10.122 On the point, the Court of Appeal took a robust approach. It 
concluded (at [61]–[62]) that the plaintiff ’s pleading for “damages in 
lieu of specific performance” was ample to give fair notice of the case 
which was to be met and to define the issues which the court would 
have to decide. Indeed, for the Court of Appeal, “the words ‘to be 
assessed’ are in effect superfluous given that any claim for damages must 
necessarily be assessed (unless otherwise agreed) whether it involves a 
simple uncontroversial line item or multiple items. It follows that a 
failure to apply for an amendment to include the words ‘to be assessed’ 
should not per se impair the discretion to order an assessment of 
damages” (at [62]). On the contrary (at [69]), adopting with approval 
the analysis taken by the New Zealand court in the case of Souster v 
Epsom Plumbing Contractors Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 515 at 521: 
Where a party seeks a decree of specific performance, he is in fact 
approbating the contract and seeking damages as an alternative 
remedy. With perfect consistency such a plaintiff is entitled to 
maintain at the hearing of the action that the contract is on foot (and 
it does remain on foot until the moment when specific performance is 
refused and damages are awarded instead) … [I]f the damages are to 
be regarded as damages for the loss of a bargain brought to an end by 
the action of the court in refusing specific performance there is only 
one time at which they should be determined, and that is when the 
bargain for which they are intended as compensation is brought to an 
end. Until the contract is brought to an end by the action of the court, 
the contract remains on foot. 
10.123 And, thus, “[h]aving ‘brought the contract to an end’ by 
refusing specific performance, it was perfectly legitimate for the trial 
judge to have ordered damages to be assessed in lieu of specific 
performance, despite the failure to adduce evidence on damages at the 
trial” (Lee Chee Wei v Tan Hor Peow Victor [2007] 3 SLR 537 at [70]). 
The plaintiff ’s failure to adduce evidence on damages at the trial 
because of his unwitting assumption that the issue of damages would be 
assessed at a separate assessment should his specific performance 
application be rejected did not cause the defendants any prejudice that 
could not be adequately compensated by costs. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal reversed the decision of the court below and ordered that an 
assessment of damages in lieu of specific performance was appropriate 
in the circumstances (at [76]–[80]). 
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Refunds of advance payments and deposits 
10.124 The final issue that remained to be considered in Lee Chee Wei v 
Tan Hor Peow Victor [2007] 3 SLR 537 was in respect of the defendant’s 
counterclaim for a refund of the $750,000 that had been paid in advance 
for the shares. To this end, the Court of Appeal usefully summarised the 
law in relation to such refunds at [83]–[85], noting that the key issue 
was to determine the nature of the payment, whether the payment was 
construed as a deposit entitling forfeiture, or as an advance payment; 
and that that nature was to be determined by the intention of the parties 
as expressed in the contract between them (at [85]). Given the wording 
of the contract, stipulating payment of the purchase price by multiple 
instalments and the specific reference to the $750,000 paid as one such 
instalment, it was plain that the sum was an advance payment which 
would, prima facie, be immediately repayable. Nevertheless, given the 
pending assessment of damages, the Court of Appeal resolved that that 
assessment ought to include an account of what was due to the 
defendant after ascertainment of the damages payable to the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the trial judge’s order on the counter-claim was also varied. 
Equitable relief against forfeiture of deposits 
10.125 In Metro Alliance Holdings & Equities Corp v WestLB AG [2008] 
1 SLR 139, the High Court provided further guidance as to when 
equitable relief against forfeiture of deposits might be granted. In this 
case, the plaintiff was granted an option to purchase certain assets to be 
acquired by the defendant. The option agreement required the plaintiff 
to deposit US$1,632,242 (the deposit) into a New York bank account 
within three days of the agreement, and to deposit additional sums from 
time to time as requested by the defendant. The option agreement also 
authorised the defendant to transfer these sums into its own account, 
and to use them to purchase the assets in question once they fell within 
certain price bands. Significantly, the option contract provided that the 
defendant was not obliged to purchase any such assets should the New 
York bank account not contain sufficient funds. 
10.126 Although a total of US$1,635,509.73 was paid into the New 
York bank account, ultimately, the transaction failed when further funds 
(totalling some US$8,759,595) were not forwarded. Unsurprisingly, 
given the express terms of the contract, the court agreed with the 
defendant that it was a condition precedent that the defendant be placed 
in sufficient funds in order to pay the balance purchase price for the 
assets in question. There was, therefore, no obligation on the defendant 
to carry out its part of the bargain (viz purchase and re-transfer of the 
assets in question to the plaintiff). Rather, as contractually provided, 
they were entitled to forfeit the deposit. 
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10.127 The question then became whether the plaintiff was entitled to 
equitable relief against such forfeiture. After examining Singapore and 
English academic authority (at [19]–[22]), the learned judge concluded 
that there were no grounds to grant any such relief. The burden lay on 
the plaintiff to demonstrate that it would be unconscionable on the part 
of the defendant to forfeit the deposit (at [22]), yet on the facts, no 
proprietary or possessory right had been forfeited. There was merely an 
arm’s length contract between two parties acting with the benefit of 
legal counsel. Further, the court was not satisfied that, “[e]ven if the 
court had power to grant relief against forfeiture in this case, it would be 
necessary to inquire into the necessity … of exercising such power, 
which altered [sic] the bargain between the parties” (at [24]). 
Accordingly, the court resolved not to grant relief against forfeiture. 
